MAX CORZO, APPELLANT,
v.
CARMEN PINEIRO, APPELLEE
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The appellate court dismissed the appeal because the order denying the motion to recover possession of property did not determine the right to immediate possession, as required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.
Max Corzo appealed a non-final order denying his motion to recover commercial real estate. The appellee, Carmen Pineiro, held record title and possess…
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SALTER, J.
Max Corzo appeals a non-final circuit court order denying his motion to recover possession of certain commercial real estate premises owned (of record) by the appellee, Carmen Pineiro. The circuit court has not yet tried or otherwise ruled upon the convoluted claims of ownership, unwritten lease rights, and corporate trickery asserted by the parties against one another. Finding no jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) permits a party to obtain interlocutory review of an order determining the “right to immediate possession of property.” In this case, Pineiro had record title and possession, while Cor-zo had neither a written lease nor a record of prior payments of rent to Pineiro. The trial court’s order denying Corzo’s motion did not determine his claims of beneficial ownership, nor did it make a determination that Pineiro was entitled to her current possession. Those claims remain pending for later determination.
As the Florida Supreme Court held in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla.1984), Rule 9.130 is to be narrowly applied so as to limit the number of appealable non-final orders. In Miami-Dade County v. Perez, 988 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), we recently dismissed an appeal in which the trial court had denied a motion for summary judgment regarding the parties’ rights and interests in certain real estate. As here, the trial court had not in that case “determined” either party’s rights of possession.
Nor do we find the requisite elements for relief if we were to deem Corzo’s case here a petition for certiorari. For the same reasons articulated in Perez, 988 So. 2d at 40, we decline to do so.
Appeal dismissed.
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Higgins v. Ryan, 81 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…purchase of stock. Cf. Malek v. Bright, 7 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (clarifying that a “sum of money” is property to which Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) applies); accord Greene v. Borsky, 961 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); see also Corzo v. Pineiro, 990 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (dismissing case where trial court did not “determine” party’s right of possession). Here, the parties’ respective claims to immediate possession remain subject to determination. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Perez, 988 So. 2d 40 (Fla.…
Authorities Cited
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1984)
- Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Adolfo Perez, 988 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)