FRED MCLEAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2008-09-23
Nos. 1D07-3455, 1D07-3080
Allen, J., Davis, J., Benton, J.
990 So. 2d 1229 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

Appellant's burglary conviction reversed because circumstantial evidence (van presence alone) was insufficient to exclude reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and probation revocation was improper due to lack of separate due process hearing.


Holding

Circumstantial evidence that appellant's van was present at victim's house on day of burglary is insufficient to support conviction, and probation revocation based on alleged new law violations is improper without a separate due process hearing.


Headnotes

[1] Circumstantial evidence that defendant's vehicle was present at burglary scene is insufficient to support conviction where such evidence does not exclude reasonable hypot…

[2] Probation revocation based on alleged new law violations requires a separate due process hearing and cannot be accomplished through a criminal trial absent defendant's st…

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Key Quotes

“Although the appellant's van's presence in the victim's yard on the day of the burglary is suspicious, it is insufficient to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

Court explaining why circumstantial evidence was inadequate to support conviction.

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was charged with burglary of a dwelling. The state presented circumstantial evidence showing appellant's van was at the victim's house on th…

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Opinion of the Court
ALLEN, J.

ALLEN, J.

The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his conviction for burglary of a dwelling and the revocation of his probation based upon new law violations. Because there was no direct evidence in this case that the appellant committed the burglary, and because the circumstantial evidence presented merely proved that the appellant’s van was at the victim’s house on the day of the burglary, the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Although the appellant’s van’s presence in the victim’s yard on the day of the burglary is suspicious, it is insufficient to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Palmer v. State, 483 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

And the revocation of probation, which was based upon five alleged new law violations, including the burglary charge, was improper because the appellant was denied his due process right to a hearing on the alleged violations before his probation was revoked. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1974).

Although the state presented evidence on the burglary charge at trial, the trial of a criminal case should not be construed as a probation revocation hearing absent a defendant’s stipulation or consent, neither of which is present in this case. See State v. Spratling, 336 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1976).

Accordingly, the appel lant’s conviction for burglary of a dwelling, the revocation order, and the resulting judgment and sentences are reversed.

DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Connell v. State, 321 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)
    …ation of probation at a hearing or that the defendant enter a knowing admission to a violation before the trial court revokes the defendant's probation.” Woodson v. State, 9 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citation omitted); see McLean v. State, 990 So. 2d 1229, 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 5th 3 DCA 2006). Importantly, “[t]o satisfy procedural due process, an opportunity to be heard must be meaningful and complete and ‘not merely colorable or illusive.’” Epps v. Sta…

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