JACKIE FOWLER, APPELLANT,
v.
ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, APPELLEE
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The School Board improperly rejected the administrative law judge's findings of fact supported by competent substantial evidence, so the court reversed and remanded for adoption of the ALJ's recommendation to reinstate the terminated employee.
When an administrative law judge's material factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, the School Board cannot reject or modify them and must adopt the ALJ's recommendations.
[1] When an administrative law judge's material factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, an administrative agency cannot reject or modify those findi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackie Fowler was terminated from employment by the Escambia County School Board. An administrative law judge conducted a formal hearing and recommend…
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PER CURIAM.
Jackie Fowler appeals from an order of the Escambia County School Board, upholding Fowler’s termination from employment. In so doing, the School Board rejected the recommendation of the administrative law judge who conducted a formal hearing of Fowler’s challenge to her termination and ultimately recommended that Fowler be reinstated. The School Board improperly rejected a number of the ALJ’s findings of fact. The material factual findings in the judge’s recommended order were supported by competent substantial evidence, so the School Board was not at liberty to reject or modify them. See § 120.57(l)(i), Fla. Stat. (2007); Prysi v. Dep’t of Health, 823 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Strickland v. Fla. A & M Univ., 799 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. McCarthy, 638 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Greseth v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 573 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Ferris v. Austin, 487 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Forehand v. Sch. Bd. of Washington County, 481 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Heifetz v. Dep’t of Bus. Reg., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a final order adopting the material findings, conclusions and recommendations of the administrative law judge.
Reversed and remanded.
BROWNING, C.J., PADOVANO, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mel Heifetz v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Horton v. State, 573 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Strickland v. Fla. A & M Univ., 799 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Ferris v. Austin, 487 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Forehand v. Sch. Bd. OF Wash. Cnty., 481 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Mark Franklin Prysi, M.D. v. Dep't OF Health, 823 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. McCARTHY, 638 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)