DEAN TREVIL, APPELLANT,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Clark v. Clark, 35 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)
  …fication order should be reversed if the noncustodial parent fails to allege the occurrence of a substantial and material change of circumstances, and the trial court fails to make a finding to that effect.”). Id. at 195; see also Miller v. Miller, 992 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“We review the instant custody modification determination de novo and reverse because the Father neither pled nor proved ‘that the circumstances have substantially, materially changed since the original custody determination…
• Ines Orta v. Suarez, 66 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
  …previously lived, are inherent in every relocation, and again exactly the type of consideration that section 61.13001(7), expressly directs should not be determinative in considering a contested motion for relocation.6 See Miller v. [*1002] Miller, 992 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (rejecting the trial courts reliance as a basis for denial of relocation on the stress and disruption to the child caused by the divorce and long-distance separation). In sum, the trial court’s findings of fact addressing bo…
• Fosshage v. Fosshage, 167 So. 3d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
  …oved the report and recommendation, and Ms. Burt appealed. There is a clear distinction between modification based on changed circumstances under section 61.13(3) and relocation under section 61.13001 of the Florida Statutes. See Miller v. Miller, 992 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2013) provides, “A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated cha…

Authorities Cited

• Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1982)