M.F. MOTHER OF L.F., A MINOR CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2008-10-15
No. 1D08-1475
WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
992 So. 2d 410 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A Florida appellate court addressed whether the trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights while preserving the father's rights. The court affirmed the termination regarding the father but reversed the termination of the mother's rights, finding the trial court failed to apply the statutory factors required when severing one parent's rights without severing the other's.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling granting the father's motion for directed verdict but reversed the termination of the mother's parental rights. The trial court reversibly erred by concluding it did not have to consider the factors set forth in section 39.811(6) when terminating only one parent's rights.


Headnotes

[1] Adoption proceedings cannot be used to circumvent statutory restrictions on terminating parental rights.

[2] A birth parent may petition for adoption, but this does not permit the termination of the other parent's rights without following statutory procedures.

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Key Quotes

“Upon Appellee's appropriate acknowledgment that the trial court reversibly erred in concluding that it did not have to consider the factors set forth in subsection (6) of this statute under the instant circumstances, we AFFIRM the trial court's rulings relating to the child's father but are constrained to REVERSE that part of the order terminating Appellant's parental rights.”

Establishes the core holding that the trial court failed to apply required statutory factors when terminating only one parent's rights.

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Facts & Procedural History

M.F. is the mother of a very young child, L.F. The Florida Department of Children & Families filed an amended petition to terminate M.F.'s parental ri…

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Opinion of the Court
BROWNING, C.J.

BROWNING, C.J.

M.F. (Appellant), who is the mother of a very young child, L.F., appeals an order granting the amended petition of the Florida Department of Children & Families (Appellee) to terminate Appellant’s parental rights based on findings that Appellant consented by failing to appear and/or “abandoned” the child, as that term is defined in sections 39.806(l)(b) & 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. (2007); and that the manifest best interest of the child called for the termination of Appellant’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2007). Appellee properly concedes that the record supports the trial court’s ruling granting the father s motion for “a directed verdict,” which we affirm. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.525(h) (addressing procedures for seeking and granting a motion for judgment of dismissal in a termination of parental rights proceeding); Committee Notes to Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.000; A.L. v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 711 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by the rules of juvenile procedure, not the rules of civil procedure).

The parties agree that section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes (2007), sets forth a list of circumstances that will allow the severing of one parent’s rights without the severing of the other parent’s rights; and that the trial court affirmatively declined to make necessary findings (requested by the attorneys for Appellee and for the Guardian ad Litem) under this statute upon agreeing to terminate only one parent’s rights. Upon Appellee’s appropriate acknowledgment that the trial court reversibly erred in concluding that it did not have to consider the factors set forth in subsection (6) of this statute under the instant circumstances, we AFFIRM the trial court’s rulings relating to the child’s father but are constrained to REVERSE that part of the order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. See P.S. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 944 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); T.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 925 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); N.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 893 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …order denying the termination and proceed with dispositional alternatives as provided by law. Motions for judgment of dismissal in dependency cases are akin to motions for directed verdicts in civil cases. See M.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 992 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.525(h) in affirming father’s motion for “directed verdict”). A court may grant a motion for directed verdict “only if there [is] no evidence upon which a jury could find against the party for whom t…

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