DANE R. BOZA, II, APPELLANT,
v.
RACHEL A. CARTER, APPELLEE
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The court held that the nonparty's conduct was not an intentional tort as a matter of law, and the driver had no duty to control the passenger's conduct. The denial of the motion for additur was not an abuse of discretion.
Appellant sued appellee, and a jury awarded damages. The jury apportioned fault to a nonparty. Appellant argued the nonparty was an intentional tortfe…
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KAHN, J.
We have considered each of the issues raised in this appeal of a jury verdict awarding damages to appellant. We cannot conclude that the nonparty to whom the jury apportioned a share of fault was an intentional tortfeasor. The ineluctable rule in Florida defines “an intentional tort as one in which the actor exhibits a deliberate intent to injure or engages in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death.” D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 438 (Fla.2001). We decline to conclude, as a matter of law, that injury was substantially certain to follow the nonparty’s conduct in this case. See, e.g., id. (rejecting argument that drunk driving is intentional tort).
Likewise, we find no authority to support appellant’s argument that appellee incurred a duty, as driver of a motor vehicle, to control the conduct of her passenger under the circumstances here. See generally Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 878 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “As a general principle, a party has no legal duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent that person from causing harm to another.” Id. at 398.
Finally, appellant made a strong factual showing that reasonable people might differ with the jury’s calculation of non-economic damages. He has not, however, shown that no reasonable judge would have denied his motion for additur. We cannot, therefore, conclude that the denial of appellant’s motion amounted to an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion. See Republic Servs. of Fla., L.P. v. Poucher, 851 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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Glenice Petit-Dos v. Sch. Bd. OF Broward Cnty., 2 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…on. Apportioning comparative negligence, the jury found School Board 20%, Snell 70%, and Petit-Dos 10% at fault. We review de novo the legal question of whether certain conduct qualifies as negligence or intentional tort. See, e.g., Boza v. Carter, 993 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The comparative fault statute, section 768.81, Florida Statutes, provides for apportionment of fault in negligence cases. However, the statute contains an exception “to any action based upon an intentional tort.” § 768.81(4…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001)
- Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 878 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Republic Servs. OF Fla., L.P. v. Poucher, 851 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)