STEVEN A. GRIFFIN, HUSBAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHANIE L. GRIFFIN, WIFE, APPELLEE
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Steven Griffin appealed his divorce judgment, challenging the trial court's imputation of income for purposes of calculating alimony. The appellate court reversed the income imputation and remanded for reconsideration of the alimony award, finding no evidence that Griffin voluntarily underemployed himself or failed to use best efforts to earn income.
The trial court reversibly erred by imputing $100,000 in annual income to appellant without evidence showing he voluntarily reduced employment, failed to use best efforts to earn income, or arranged his financial affairs to shortchange appellee. The court's failure to set forth findings supporting the income imputation and the sources for that income constituted reversible error.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it imputes income to a party without sufficient record evidence justifying the imputation.
[2] A trial court may impute income to a party if it is shown that the party is capable of earning more than they are currently earning, and has failed to use their best effo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A spouse's ability to pay may be determined not only from net income, but also net worth, past earnings, and the value of the parties' capital assets.”
Establishes the legal framework for determining a payor spouse's ability to pay alimony, including the relevance of past earnings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSteven Griffin testified his 2006 income was $57,476.96, which he characterized as an anomaly caused by unusual weather conditions and difficulties fr…
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THOMAS, J.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, equitably distributing their assets and liabilities, and awarding Appellee $2,500 in permanent periodic alimony. Because we find that the trial court erred by imputing income to Appellant, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the alimony award. We affirm all other issues raised by Appellant.
A trial court’s alimony award is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202-03 (Fla.1980). When awarding permanent periodic alimony, the court must consider the statutory factors set out in section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2004), including the payee spouse’s needs and the payor spouse’s ability to pay. Id. at 1201. “A spouse’s ability to pay may be determined not only from net income, but also net worth, past earnings, and the value of the parties’ capital assets.” Id. at 1202 (citing Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1972)). Past earnings, however, unless reflective of a party’s expected earnings in the immediate future, cannot form the basis for an alimony award. Woodard v. Woodard, 634 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla. 6th DCA 1994).
Appellant testified that his income in 2006 was $57,476.96, but that this was an anomaly based on unusual weather conditions and personal difficulties associated with his ongoing divorce proceedings, both of which significantly decreased his income. He testified that he did not want the court to consider this amount as his annual income and that he expected to earn $85,000 in gross income in 2007, including health insurance premiums which his business pays for himself and his family, as well as his vehicle expenses paid by his business. The trial court imputed Appellant’s annual income to be $100,000 based on pre-2006 earnings and loan repayments from his business. We find that the court reversibly erred by imputing income to Appellant.
In determining the amount of alimony based on the payor spouse’s income, a court may impute income when it is shown that a party is capable of earning more than he or she is currently earning. Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). In Smith v. Smith, this court held that
[a] trial court can impute income where a spouse has failed to use his or her best efforts to earn income. A claim that a payor spouse has arranged his financial affairs or employment situation so as to shortchange the payee spouse is a valid matter to be explored in determining the payor’s real ability to pay. When the obligor spouse voluntarily becomes unemployed or underemployed, the income that he or she is capable of earning may be imputed for purposes of determining an appropriate award of support.
737 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citations omitted). No evidence was presented showing that Appellant voluntarily reduced his employment or that he failed to use his best efforts to earn income. Nor was any evidence presented showing that he arranged his financial affairs in order to shortchange Appellee. Accordingly, no record evidence justifies the court’s imputation of income. See Leonard, 971 So. 2d at 266.
Further, a trial court reversibly errs when it imputes income to a party without setting forth in its final judgment the amount imputed and the sources for this income. Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (Booth, J., dissenting). Here, the court failed to make any findings supporting its imputation of income and the sources for this income, or explain how it arrived at its projected $100,000 in annual income to Appellant in light of Appellant’s testimony that he expected to earn $85,000. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the alimony award.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
BROWNING, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur.
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Broemer v. Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ic findings regarding the source and amount of imputed income, which must be based on evidence of “employment potential and probable earnings based on history, qualifications, and prevailing wages.” Schram, 932 So. 2d at 250; see Griffin v. Griffin, 993 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The former husband presented evidence that would allow income to be imputed to the former wife. To explain her failure to seek outside employment over the years, the former wife contended that her debilitating, progressiv…
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Eroga v. Eroga, 166 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…story, occupational qualifications, and the current job market in the community to support the imputation of income. See Rabbath v. Farid, 4 So. 3d 778, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Failure to make these findings results in reversal. Griffin v. Griffin, 993 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Here, while there is no dispute concerning the former husband’s past work history, reliance on this factor alone is insufficient to impute income. Freilich v. Freilich, 897 So. 2d 537, 544 (Fla. 5th [*186] DCA 2005); Torr…
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Stough v. Laurel L. Stough, 18 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…pable of employment and imputed income to him. This was incorrect. To impute income to the former husband, the trial court was required to set “forth in its final judgment the amount imputed and the sources for this income.” See Griffin v. Griffin, 993 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Porter v. Porter, 873 So. 2d 538, 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing the denial of alimony as the trial court imputed income to a spouse without inquiring into “her current employment prospects [or] making particu…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972)
- Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Woodard v. Jaymie Sands Woodard, 634 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- McCALL v. State, 737 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Smith v. Smith, 737 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)