ALEX DUNCAN, APPELLANT,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff's Off. & Scibal Ins. Grp., 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
  …tutory presumption and presented no corroborating or supporting medical evidence. As one might expect, we have generally followed Caldwell, as construed in City of Temple Terrace, in our ensuing case law. See Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Lentini v. City of West Palm Beach, 980 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Saldana v. Miami-Dade County, 978 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis, 953 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Seminole Coun…
• Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst. & Div. of Risk Mgmt., 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
  …tachycardia. The presumption afforded by section 112.18(1)(2007) relieves a qualifying claimant from the necessity of proving occupational causation of the heart disease resulting in disability or death. See Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff’s Office, 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), this court stated as follows: In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18(1) presumption. The presumption does not va…
• City OF Tavares & Gallagher Bassett Serv., Inc. v. Harper, 230 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
  …context of the unique medical history of the claim-ani>—not simply “any evidence” as it may apply to the population at large. Our reading pf the plain language here is consistent with this court’s opinion in Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Talpesh, the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to that claimant’s coronary artery disease because the pre-employment examination revealed high blood pressure. This court found that t…

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Authorities Cited

• State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
• Johnson v. State, 763 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2000)