STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
D.A.G., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's order vacating a juvenile delinquency disposition order entered over eight years prior. The appellate court reversed, holding that the disposition order was voidable rather than void, and therefore the motion to vacate was untimely under the one-year filing requirement of Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.140(b).
The disposition order was voidable, not void, because the court was legally organized, had subject matter jurisdiction, and the juvenile was given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the motion to vacate had to be filed within one year of the order's entry under Rule 8.140(b), and the eight-and-a-half-year delayed motion was untimely and should have been denied.
[1] A judgment is not void for purposes of vacating it under Rule 8.140(a) where the court is legally organized, has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the parties have…
[2] A motion to vacate a juvenile disposition order, which is voidable rather than void, must be filed within one year of the order's entry, absent specific exceptions.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that where a court is legally organized and has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be heard, then errors, irregularities or wrongdoing in proceedings, short of illegal deprivation of opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void.”
Establishes the legal standard for when a judgment is void versus voidable; foundational principle supporting the holding that the disposition order was voidable, not void.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA disposition order adjudicating the appellee a delinquent child was entered in 1999. Approximately eight and a half years later, the appellee filed a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The state seeks review of a final order vacating an order of disposition adjudicating appellee a delinquent child entered some eight and a half years before the Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.140(a)(4) motion seeking to have it vacated was filed.
Rule 8.140(b) requires that all motions of the type filed by appellee except those claiming that the order or judgment sought to be vacated is void be filed within one year after the order or judgment was entered.
The trial court based its conclusion that the disposition order was void on its determination that “the Court failed to make the requisite inquiry pursuant to Rule 8.080 Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure” prior to accepting appellee’s plea. Our supreme court has told us that “[i]t is well settled that where a court is legally organized and has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be heard, then errors, irregularities or wrongdoing in proceedings, short of illegal deprivation of opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void.” Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So. 2d 443, 445 (Fla.1990) (citing State ex rel. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599, 15 So. 2d 324 (1943)).
Here, there is no suggestion that the court entering the order of disposition in 1999 was not legally organized or lacked subject matter jurisdiction; nor is there anything to suggest that appellee was illegally deprived of an opportunity to be heard before the order was entered.
Accordingly, while appellee’s plea might have been “void” for purposes of Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.080(f) had he demonstrated prejudice (which he failed to do because he did not claim that he would not have entered a plea had he been properly questioned), for purposes of rule 8.140(a) the disposition order is merely “voidable,” rather than “void.” As such, appellee’s motion had to be filed within one year of the date on which the disposition order was entered. Because it was filed some seven and a half years too late, it was untimely and should have been denied.
The trial court’s order granting the motion and vacating the disposition order is, accordingly, reversed.
REVERSED.
KAHN, WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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State v. S.S., 40 So. 3d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…e plea is set aside because of irregularities or deficiencies in the plea proceedings, the case does not go away. Rather, the proceedings begin anew and [*10] the juvenile is given the opportunity for a new adjudicatory hearing. In State v. D.A.G., 995 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the first district entertained the state’s appeal of an order vacating an order of disposition that adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. As here, the order was based on the juvenile’s assertion that the trial court failed to make…1 / 2
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W.P. v. State, 202 So. 3d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla.1994); Register v. State, 619 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. D.A.G., 995 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); I.B. v. State, 816 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Bryant v. State, 800 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Horton v. State, 696 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). KHOUZAM, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Arnaldo Curbelo, M.D. v. Ullman, 571 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1990)
- State OF Fla. ex rel. Fulton BAG & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599 (Fla. 1943)