CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
EUMELIA CORTES AND AMADO SABINA, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate division departed from the essential requirements of law by vacating a final administrative enforcement order and a mitigation order when the enforcement order was not timely appealed and the mitigation order was based on erroneous conclusions regarding due process and evidence competency.
[1] A petition for writ of certiorari is an appropriate method to review a circuit court appellate division's decision that departs from the essential requirements of law.
[2] The scope of review on second-tier certiorari is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA property owner pled guilty to a code violation, leading to an enforcement order and subsequent fines. A mitigation hearing reduced the fines, but th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Scope Of Appellate Review cases and more on FLexlaw
WELLS, J.
The City of Miami petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the circuit court appellate division which vacates both a final administrative enforcement order assessing a fine for code violations and a mitigation order reducing that fine. We agree with the City that the appellate division’s decision constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law and grant the petition for certiorari.
We have jurisdiction to conduct a review by petition for writ of certiorari of an appellate decision of the circuit court. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(B). The scope of our review on second-tier certiorari is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.1995); see also Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Castro v. Miami-Dade County Code Enforcement, 967 So. 2d 230, 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
As we observed in Southern Group Indem., Inc. v. Humanitary Health Care, Inc., 975 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), citing to Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla.2000), while we are governed by a very narrow standard of review, our discretionary use of our certiorari power must not be so narrowly applied as to deprive litigants and the public to essential justice. From this observation follows our conclusion that the exercise of our certiorari power is appropriate in this case.
On October 3, 2003, the City’s Code Enforcement Board (“Board”) held a hearing where property owner Amado Sabina pled guilty to a code violation for performance of work on a residential property without a final permit. The Board entered an enforcement order on October 10, 2003. Property owners Sabina and Eumelia Cortes were afforded 60 days to correct the violation or face a fine of $250 per day.
The property owners failed to correct the violations and fines totaling $105,750 were assessed. On June 2, 2005, the Board held a mitigation hearing to determine whether to reduce the amount of the fines accrued. All of the witnesses at the hearing were duly sworn. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Board reduced the fine to $10,000 and entered a mitigation order. The property owners appealed the mitigation order to the appellate division of the circuit court, arguing that the mitigation order should be set aside because the city inspector had improperly delayed inspection for a period of six months. However the Board had already accepted this argument in reducing the fine to $10,000. The appellate division nonetheless reversed both the enforcement and mitigation orders.
As to the enforcement order, Sabina, as property owner, pled guilty at the enforcement hearing, and neither he nor fellow property owner Cortes appealed that order. See § 162.11, Fla. Stat. (2007) (governing appeals from final orders of code enforcement boards; “An appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the execution of the order to be appealed.”). Thus, the enforcement order was outside the scope of the circuit court’s review, and the appellate division’s order vacating the Board’s original enforcement order cannot stand.
As to the mitigation order, the appellate division did not adopt the property owners’ one and only claim of error-the claim of delayed inspection. Instead, the court concluded that the Board violated the property owners’ due process rights and that the evidence supporting the mitigation order was “incompetent.” It based these conclusions on its observations that the property owners had been denied the right to cross-examine the City’s code enforcement officer and that the testimony at the mitigation hearing was unsworn.
Yet the property owners presented the testimony of owner Sabina as well as documentary evidence. They did not object to any evidence and did not ask to cross-examine any witnesses. They did not ask to examine any evidence relied upon by the City’s code enforcement officer. See Acree v. State, 158 Fla. 561, 15 So. 2d 262 (1943) (concluding that the right to cross-examination was waived where party did not request to exercise that right); City of St. Petersburg v. Cardinal Indus. Dev. Corp., 493 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); see generally Singer v. Borbua, 497 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (“It is well settled that, in order to obtain appellate review, alleged errors relied upon for reversal must be raised clearly, concisely and separately as points on appeal”) Moreover the testimony relied on was made under oath and was otherwise competent.1
Thus we conclude that the appellate division failed to apply the correct law and in doing so deprived the litigants and the public to essential justice. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and remand this case to the circuit court appellate division with directions to reinstate both the enforcement and mitigation orders.
. As the City explains, the transcript filed with the appellate division was transcribed from the video and was incomplete as it did not include the beginning of the hearing, which demonstrates that all present were sworn. The circuit court in addressing issues not raised by property owners improperly concluded that the testimony was incompetent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
City OF Miami v. Vernell Reynolds, 34 So. 3d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…mined by the Civil Service Board, the penalty to be assessed comes within the exclusive discretion of the City Manager and may be imposed without elucidation. We agree with the City and grant the petition for certiorari. See City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (finding that this court has jurisdiction to conduct a second-tier certiorari review of an appellate decision of the circuit court to determine whether it: (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law)…
-
Hayes v. Monroe Cnty., 337 So. 3d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)…0 (Fla. 1995)). “[W]hile we are governed by a very narrow standard of review, our discretionary use of our certiorari power must not be so narrowly applied as to deprive litigants and the public [of] essential justice.” City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Procedural due process is not an issue here, so we must determine whether the circuit court applied the correct law. The issues in the instant petition revolve around the core concern that the magistrate failed to con…
-
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Cathleen Ainsworth, 18 So. 3d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…plied the correct law. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the opinion below on grounds that the Circuit Court did not apply the correct law. See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla.1995); City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Under a general liability insurance policy, MedPay coverage is primarily intended to pay for injuries sustained by the members of the general public while on the insured’s premises or otherwise exposed to the insured’s operation…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Farren Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2000)
- Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2003)
- Acree v. State, 153 Fla. 561 (Fla. 1943)
- Seymour Singer v. Florentino Borbua, 497 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- The City OF ST. Petersburg v. Cardinal Indus. Dev. Corp., 493 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Castro v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Code Enf't, 967 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- S. Grp. Indem., Inc. v. Humanitary Health Care, Inc., 975 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)