JOSEPH GOTTDIENER
v.
JOE'S RESTAURANT, INC.

Fla. | 1933-08-10
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield and Terrell, J. J., concur.
111 Fla. 741 Florida Supreme Court (1933) Caution
Also reported at: 149 So. 646
Cited by 36 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Florida restaurant owner sought to enjoin a former employee from using the confusingly similar trade name "Little Joe's Restaurant" for a competing business located nearby. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court's broad injunction, holding that while the defendant could be enjoined from creating a likelihood of confusion, the injunction must permit him to use his identifying name if the word "Little" is made equally conspicuous with "Joe's Restaurant" to prevent public confusion.


Holding

The court reversed the lower court's broad injunction and held that the defendant may not be absolutely prohibited from using his identifying name, but the manner of using it may be regulated by injunction. The injunction should require that any signs or advertisements using "Little Joe's Restaurant" display the word "Little" in equally conspicuous type as "Joe's Restaurant" to prevent confusion between the two businesses.


Key Quotes

“While the use of one's own name cannot be absolutely enjoined, nevertheless the manner of using it may be regulated by injunction.”

Establishes the core principle that while a defendant has a right to use an identifying name, courts may regulate the manner of use to prevent unfair competition.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellee owned and operated "Joe's Restaurant" (also known as "Joe's") at 227 Biscayne Street in Miami Beach, Florida for over ten years, acquiring a …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
Brown, J.

Brown, J.

Appellee filed its bill against appellant, defendant in the court below, to enjoin the defendant from the use of the name “Little Joe’s Restaurant” and any other name or names similar to the name “Joe’s Restaurant” and “Joe’s.”

A final decree was rendered overruling all exceptions to the master’s report and enjoining the defendant, and any and all persons claiming under him, in the operation of the restaurant business theretofore maintained by the defendant at Miami Beach, Florida, from any and all use as a means of identifying such business of the words “Little Joe’s” or “Little Joe’s Restaurant” or other words or manner of designation prejudicially similar to the names by which the restaurant business of the complainant had theretofore been identified before the public, to-wit: “Joe’s” and “Joe’s Restaurant.” It was further ordered that the defendant forthwith discontinue the use of the words “Little Joe’s” or “Little Joe’s Restaurant” in connection with, or as a part of any and all signs, placards, and other means of *743advertisement then in use by him as a means of identifying his restaurant business before the public.

Considerable testimony was taken in the case and the facts shown thereby are very well summed up in the report of General Master Dowell in the following paragraphs of the report:

, “1. I find that the complainant is the owner and operator of Joe’s Restaurant, also known as Joe’s, located at number 227 Biscayne Street, Miami Beach, Florida, at which address said restaurant, under said names, has been conducted continuously for more than ten years; that during the greater portion of said period of time said restaurant has been under the active management; operation and control of one Joseph Weiss, by whom said business was founded, from whom it took its name and under whose intelligent direction it has prospered and acquired a wide reputation for the excellence in cuisine and unique service.
“2. I find that the defendant, some seven years ago, was employed by Joe’s Restaurant as a waiter; that he was so employed for a period of some three years during which time he acquired an intimate knowledge of the various' recipes uniformly used by complainant in the preparation of food for his patrons and also familiarized himself with the unique method of serving such patrons.
“3. I find that, some four years ago, defendant, having been discharged, in the year 1926, opened a restaurant of his own, within six city blocks of complainant’s restaurant, under the trade name of “Little Joe’s Restaurant” or “Little Joe.” That in the following year, still using the same name, he moved his place of business to a location within two blocks of complainant’s restaurant and so situated that most of complainant’s patrons necessarily passed “Little Joe’s” place on their way to complainant’s. • That in the conduct *744of his business, defendant has uniformly imitated the .peculiar service and methods of preparing food stuffs originated at Miami Beach and there used by complainant in building a reputation for excellence in food and service, both locally as well as among a foreign clientele.
“4. I further find that defendant has caused to be erected over his place of business an electric sign which, when illuminated brings out in bold relief the. word “Joe’s,” the word “Little” in much smaller letters, being illegible at a comparatively short distance.
“5. I further, find that, in the operation and conduct of his business, defendant through the use.of a closely similar trade name and by. adopting other methods of deception as related in paragraphs three and four, supta; is, as a matter of fact, practicing an imposition upon the public to the material injury of complainant.”

The master recommended that the court enter its final decree in accordance with the prayer for relief set forth in the bill. There was some evidence that the defendant was called “Little Joe” by his friends.

The subject of trade marks and trade names is discussed in El Modelo Cigar Manufacturing Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 7 So. 23, and in Children’s Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345.

The writer is of the opinion that the decree of the court below, in view of all circumstances shown in the pleadings and evidence, might well be affirmed as written, but the majority of the Court are of the opinion that the terms of the injunction granted are too broad. The majority holding is that the injunction of the defendant in the court below should have been so framed as to enjoin the defendant from using or maintaining in connection with his business any *745signs, placards or other means of advertisement in which the word “Little” preceeding' the words “Joe’s Restaurant” was printed or framed in such small type of characters as to tend to confuse the identifying of his restaurant business with that of “Joe’s Restaurant,” that is, that such signs, placards and means of advertisements used or to be used by the defendant should be so prepared as to make the word “Little’ in designating the business of “Little Joe’s Restaurant” equally conspicuous with the succeeding words, “Joe’s Restaurant,” so as to prevent any confusion in the minds of the public between the businesses respectively of the appellant and the appellee.

It follows that the decree as granted is erroneous and must be reversed with directions for reforming the decree so as to conform with the holding herein above outlined.

A general discussion of this question will be found in 63 C. J. 429-436. It is the opinion of the Court that the cases therein cited uphold the decision here made. Thus, on pp. 431-432 of 63 C. J., it is said:

“However, the right to use a personal name in a business even one’s own, is subject to the general rules in regard to unfair competition. Personal names must be used truthfully and in good faith, or their use will be enjoined. A man must use his own name honestly and not as a means of pirating upon the good will and reputation of' a rival by passing off his goods or business as the goods or business of his rival who gave the name its reputation and value. No one will be permitted to use even his own name with the fraudulent intention of appropriating the good will of a business established and built up by another person of the same name. While the use of one’s own name cannot be absolutely enjoined, nevertheless the manner of using it may be regulated by injunction. No person will be allowed *746to use even his own name in such a manner as to inflict an unnecessary injury upon another, and such as would not naturally result from the mere identity or similarity of names, but where the only confusion created is that which results from the similarity of names, the courts will not interfere. No device or artifice, such as an imitative dress of goods, or an inconspicuous size of type, misleading advertisements, etc., will be permitted which will facilitate or increase the deception caused by the similarity of names.”

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Davis, C. J., and Whitfield and Terrell, J. J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137 (Fla. 1934)
    …extent necessary to suppress such unfair activities. But that would be the granting of injunctive relief upon a different principle—and not a negative specific enforcement’of an inequitable contract by injunction. See Gottdiener v. Joe’s Restaurant, 111 Fla. 741, 149 Sou. Rep. 646, for a discussion of the latter principle. I therefore concur in the opinion and conclusion on rehearing.…
  • ….for another reason. Even though one may have a right to use a tradename which happens to be similar to that of another, this right does not authorize one to use the tradename in a manner which tends to be deceptive. Gottdiener v. Joe’s Restaurant, 111 Fla. 741, 149 So. 646 (1933); McGhan v. McGhan, supra; May v. May, 45 So. 2d 494 (Fla.1950). [*399] In the instant case, petitioner and respondent both operated under the “Jitney Junior” banner and liked the tradename because it was a fairly accurate descrip…
  • Mrs. Frank P. McGhan v. McGhan, 115 Fla. 414 (Fla. 1934)
    …Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, 59 Wash. 428, 110 Pac. Rep. 23, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 251. But where only confusion created results from mere similarity of persons’ names when used in business, the courts will not interfere. Gottdiener v. Joe’s Restaurant, 111 Fla. 741, 149 Sou. Rep. 646. In the present case the evidence and pleadings show that while the name, “McGhan A. A. Amubulance Service,” is simply a trade name adopted by King Funeral Home, Inc., which is the real operator of such service, yet it is neverth…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw