E.J., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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E.J., a juvenile, appeals a restitution order entered after his guilty plea to first-degree misdemeanor battery. The court reversed the restitution order because the trial court failed to make adequate findings regarding the juvenile's present or future ability to pay the ordered $21,474 in restitution.
A restitution order against a juvenile cannot be imposed without some testimony or evidence supporting a finding that the juvenile can reasonably pay the ordered amount. While there is no requirement that a juvenile be employed before restitution is ordered, the trial court must make specific findings regarding the juvenile's ability to earn and pay as required by statute. An open-ended deferral of ability-to-pay findings through future status conferences does not satisfy statutory requirements.
[1] A restitution order against a juvenile must be supported by evidence of the juvenile's present or future ability to pay.
[2] A court cannot impose restitution on a juvenile without making findings, supported by evidence, as to what the juvenile can reasonably be expected to earn.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of any evidence, restitution cannot be ordered.”
Establishes the core holding that some evidence of ability to pay is required before imposing restitution
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceE.J., a 15-year-old juvenile, pleaded guilty to first-degree misdemeanor battery. At the restitution hearing, the State presented medical bills exceed…
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E.J., a juvenile, appeals an order imposing restitution following his plea of guilty to first-degree misdemeanor battery. Because of the absence of proof regarding E.J.’s present or future ability to pay the restitution, we reverse.
At the restitution hearing, the State presented medical bills in excess of $20,000. There was no evidence establishing the juvenile’s present or future ability to pay that amount. The court found the juvenile did not have the present ability to pay. However, the court orally set the restitution amount at $21,474 and retained jurisdiction to review ability to pay every six months.
We reverse the restitution order on the authority of M.W.G. v. State, 945 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In M.W.G., the court reversed a restitution order entered against an unemployed child because the court did not make any findings, and no evidence was presented, as to what the child could reasonably be expected to earn, or whether the child could reasonably be expected to earn sufficient income to pay the ordered restitution. Id. at 601.
While there is no requirement that a child be employed before a restitution order can be entered against him or her, J.A.B. v. State, 993 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and M.W.G., there must be some testimony to support the finding that the juvenile can reasonably pay the ordered amount. Here, the juvenile testified that he was fifteen and had no prospects of employment. He was in detention at the time of the hearing and awaiting disposition in another case. He was doubtful of his chances to secure employment based on his juvenile record. In the absence of any evidence, restitution cannot be ordered.
Recognizing this problem, the trial court essentially deferred the “ability to pay” fact finding by setting the case for future status conferences every six months. This approach does not satisfy the requirements of section 985.231 Fla. Stat. (2007).
There is, however, authority to defer the restitution payment findings until certain specific events occur. For example, in M.H. v. State, 698 So.2d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), restitution was ordered as part of the juvenile’s community control. The payments were ordered to begin within 60 days of the child turning sixteen or finding employment. In I.M. v. State, 958 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the court set up a restitution payment plan, but the first installment was deferred until the child graduated high school or turned eighteen. *253These orders are distinguishable from the open-ended deferral ordered in this case.
Based on the foregoing, we must reverse the restitution order and remand for a hearing on the child’s ability to earn and to pay. If the court again imposes restitution on remand, it must make the findings required by section 985.231(1)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes (2006).
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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L.W. v. State, 163 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…t the time the restitution is imposed, not merely when the court is subsequently required to enforce the order or determine whether the juvenile violated his probation.2 E.g., S.S. v. State, 122 So. 3d 499, 502-03 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); E.J. v. State, 1 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); I.M. v. State, 955 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The State argues that this issue was not preserved for appeal and is not fundamental error. We agree that th…
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B.W. v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…idence on B.W.’s employment prospects. Although a child need not presently be employed for a court to impose restitution, “there must be some testimony to support the finding that the juvenile can reasonably pay the ordered amount.” E.J. v. State, 1 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citations omitted). We reverse the restitution order because the court did not make a finding that B.W. could reasonably be expected to pay the restitution amount. On remand, before ordering an amount of restitution, the c…
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S.S. v. State, 95 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…inding made by the trial court in that regard. Our case law is fairly consistent in the interpretation of section 985.437, Florida Statutes (2011), as requiring an ability-to-pay finding before a court orders juvenile restitution. See E.J. v. State, 1 So. 3d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); K.T.M v. State, 969 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“When no evidence of what the child could reasonably be expected to earn is presented at the restitution hearing, the tri…
Authorities Cited
- M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- I.M. v. State, 958 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- J.A.B. v. State, 993 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- M.H. v. State, 698 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)