BRENDA LIFT, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ALAN LIFT, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a divorce final judgment that failed to include required findings of fact regarding equitable distribution and alimony, awarded the wife's veterinary business as a 50% interest to both parties (forcing them into unwanted business partnership), ignored stipulations reached by the parties, and ordered sale of the marital home without a proper pleading requesting such relief.
The court held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to make required specific written findings of fact for equitable distribution, improperly awarding joint interests in the veterinary business thereby forcing unwanted business partnership, ignoring binding stipulations, ordering home sale without proper pleading, and failing to make findings of fact regarding alimony statutory factors.
[1] A trial court's failure to make specific written findings of fact regarding equitable distribution constitutes reversible error and precludes meaningful appellate review.
[2] Compelling former spouses to remain business partners after a divorce constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In fashioning an equitable distribution, a court is required to make specific written findings of fact that identify, classify, value, and distribute the parties' assets and liabilities.”
Establishes the mandatory requirement for findings of fact in equitable distribution cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn dissolving the Lifts' marriage, the trial court awarded each party a 50% interest in the wife's veterinary business, the marital home, and other as…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Partition Of Property cases and more on FLexlaw
In its final judgment dissolving the Lifts’ marriage, the trial court awarded each party a fifty percent interest in the wife’s veterinary business, the marital home, and all other assets (except the parties’ six cats, which were awarded to the wife), and ordered that the marital home be sold after the expiration of ninety days from the date of the final judgment. The court also awarded the husband permanent alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month.
In this appeal and cross-appeal, both parties correctly point out that while the final judgment tracked the language of section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes, it contained no specific findings of fact. “In fashioning an equitable distribution, a court is required to make specific written findings of fact that identify, classify, value, and distribute the parties’ assets and liabilities.” Pavese v. Pavese, 932 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Reddell v. Reddell, 899 So.2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[a] trial court’s failure to make requisite findings regarding an equitable distribution constitutes reversible error”). The failure to do so precludes meaningful appellate review. Pavese, 932 So.2d at 1270.
Second, the parties correctly agree that the trial court erred in awarding each a half interest in the wife’s veterinary business, thereby forcing them to be business partners. As we have previously held, compelling former spouses to remain in business together “creates [an] intolerable *261situation.” Novak v. Novak, 429 So.2d 414, 414-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also Manolakos v. Manolakos, 871 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“[dissolution of marriage being what it is, it is clearly an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order two parties who have stated that they do not want to continue to work together after their divorce to do just that”).
Third, the parties agree that the trial court erred in ignoring the following stipulations reached by the parties at trial: (1) The wife stipulated that the husband should be awarded the parties’ car; (2) the husband stipulated that the wife should be awarded the parties’ furniture; and (3) the husband stipulated that the wife should be awarded the veterinary business and that he would accept the wife’s valuation of the business. Because appropriately made stipulations entered into by the parties are generally binding on the court as well as on the parties, the court erred in failing to follow them.
Finally, the parties agree that the trial court could not order the sale of the marital home where neither side filed a pleading requesting that relief. See Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So.2d 37, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also Poitier v. Poitier, 458 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (trial court erred “by ordering the partition and sale of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entireties in the absence of an appropriate request”); Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 345 So.2d 819, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (“to justify partition, one of the parties must plead a right thereto”). Even “[a] general prayer for equitable division of the parties’ property in the petition for dissolution of marriage is not sufficient to justify partition of the parties’ jointly-held property.” Martinez, 573 So.2d at 43.
As for the alimony award, the wife claims that the trial court also again erred in failing to make findings of fact pursuant to section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes. We agree. A trial court must support its alimony decision by including findings of fact in the final judgment. Williams v. Williams, 923 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Geoghegan v. Geoghegan, 969 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“[i]n order to facilitate meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s alimony determination, it is incumbent upon the trial court to include specific findings of fact regarding the factors enumerated in section 61.08(2)(a)-(g)”).
Here the trial court made no findings regarding the husband’s earning ability and it is unclear whether the court imputed income to him or factored the husband’s potential earnings into the alimony award. Thus, even if permanent alimony is justified in this case, this court cannot review the appropriateness of the amount. See Melo v. Melo, 864 So.2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Julia v. Julia, 146 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…ings of fact regarding equitable distribution. In particular, the court’s decision did not include “specific written findings of fact” as to the individual valuation of significant marital assets. See § 61.075(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013); Lift v. Lift, 1 So. 3d 259, 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (noting the failure to include “specific written findings of fact that identify, classify, value, and distribute the parties’ assets and liabilities” in a trial court order regarding equitable distribution “precludes meaning…
-
Galstyan v. Galstyan, 85 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ther spouse to make alimony payments.” Segall v. Segall, 708 So. 2d 983, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In determining ability to pay, the trial court must make specific findings of fact regarding the paying spouse’s financial resources. See Lift v. Lift, 1 So. 3d 259, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders a spouse to make a monthly alimony payment which “greatly exceeds the [spouse’s] monthly income without competent substantial evidence that [his] actual monthly income exc…
-
Wagner v. Wagner, 61 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…ertain assets. See Reddell, 899 So. 2d at 1155 (citing Brock v. Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)). Consequently, it was error for the trial court to fail to identify and include a valuation of the marital home furnishings. See Lift v. Lift, 1 So. 3d 259, 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reversing trial court for failure to make specific findings of fact identifying and valuing parties’ assets). Thus, we reverse this portion of the judgment and remand for the trial court to make the requisite findings. Reg…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Williams v. Williams, 923 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Pavese v. Pavese, 932 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Albert J.W. Novak v. Novak, 429 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Maxwell G. Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 345 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Geoghegan v. Geoghegan, 969 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Manolakos v. Amy S. Manolakos, Gold Coast Chiropractic Ctr., P.A., 871 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Melo v. Melo, 864 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
- Poitier v. Poitier, 458 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- LaFLEUR v. State, 899 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)