ARTHUR QUELER, JANET HILLELSON, AS TRUSTEE OF THE YOUNG REVOCABLE TRUST, KATHERINE KENNEY, ARNOLD LIPSCHUTZ, AS TRUSTEE OF THE ARNOLD LIPSCHUTZ REVOCABLE TRUST, AND MARSHA LIPSCHUTZ, AS TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY OF THE MARSHA LIPSCHUTZ REVOCABLE TRUST, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE RECEIVERSHIP OF CUMBERLAND CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION AUTHORIZED TO TRANSACT AN INSURANCE BUSINESS IN FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2009-01-21
No. 1D08-1794
LEWIS and THOMAS, JJ, and LAWRENCE, JR., L. ARTHUR, Senior Judge, concur.
1 So. 3d 1140 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order that granted a receivership's motion to declare four subpoenas null and void and impose a protective order. The First District Court of Appeal granted the writ, holding that a receivership court lacks authority to prohibit discovery on the receiver and that the respondent should have sought relief in the court where the underlying actions were pending.


Holding

A receivership court has no authority to prohibit service of discovery on the receiver. The appropriate remedy was for the receiver to seek a protective order in the Broward County court where the underlying actions were pending, not in the receivership court.


Headnotes

[1] A receivership court lacks authority to prohibit service of discovery on the receiver.

[2] A party seeking a protective order regarding subpoenas may seek such relief in the court where the underlying action is pending.

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Key Quotes

“a receivership court has no authority to prohibit service of discovery on the receiver”

Establishes the core holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the protective order

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Facts & Procedural History

Four identical non-party subpoenas duces tecum were issued in pending Broward County court actions, directed to the Florida Department of Financial Se…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari quashing the lower court’s order which granted Respondent’s motion to determine four subpoenas as null and void and seeking a protective order enjoining the issuance of further subpoenas. Because we *1141find the lower court’s order was issued erroneously, we grant the writ.

In order to obtain a writ of certio-rari, a petitioner must establish that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law which caused a material injury and which cannot be corrected through any other means. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O’Hearn, 975 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

The instant case arises from a non-final order which granted Respondent’s “Expedited Petition for Instructions, Motion to Determine Subpoenas are Null and Void, and/or Motion for Protective Order.” The petition was filed in Leon County Circuit Court in response to four identical non-party subpoenas duces tecum issued in four pending Broward County Court actions. The subpoenas were directed to the Florida Department of Financial Services, as receiver of Cumberland Casualty & Surety Company, neither of which are parties to the Broward County suits. As a result, Respondent filed its petition in Leon County Circuit Court, the court overseeing the receivership of Cumberland Casualty & Surety Company. However, a receivership court has no authority to prohibit service of discovery on the receiver. In re Receivership of Guarantee Sec. Life Ins. Co., 678 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Further, Respondent could have sought a protective order in the Broward County court where the action associated with the subpoenas is pending. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). In addition, the trial court’s error has caused irreparable harm, as Petitioners will be denied discovery, and the denial of such discovery is not reviewable on direct appeal. See Office of the Attorney Gen. v. Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc., 800 So.2d 255, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (granting petition for writ of certio-rari to review trial court’s protective order preventing petitioner from obtaining discovery, where injury to petitioner caused by order was irreparable because, after final judgment, “there would be no practical way to determine ... what the testimony would be or how it would affect the result”).

Accordingly, because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable harm to Petitioners, we GRANT the petition for writ of certiorari and QUASH the lower court’s order.

LEWIS and THOMAS, JJ, and LAWRENCE, JR., L. ARTHUR, Senior Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Baldwin v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 45 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …can be substituted for the ones in Shands’ custody. Second, no method would allow a determination post-judgment as to how the absence of these documents affected the outcome of the case. See also Queler v. Receivership of Cumberland Cas. & Sur. Co., 1 So. 3d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing order granting motion to determine four subpoenas as null and void, where denial of discovery constituted irreparable harm not reviewable on direct appeal); Office of A…
  • Eutsay v. State, 103 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …sult of this available appellate remedy, we dismiss the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of showing irreparable harm. DISMISSED. LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. . Queler v. Receivership of Cumberland Cas. & Sur. Co., 1 So. 3d 1140, 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Baldwin v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 45 So. 3d 118, 122-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).…

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