PAUL LUXAMA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2009-01-21
No. 4D07-2711
MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
1 So. 3d 1146 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Paul Luxama appealed his convictions for second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and related firearm offenses. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions and sentences, rejecting his arguments that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the forcible felony exception to justifiable use of deadly force and in denying his motion to discharge counsel.


Holding

The court held that the jury instruction on the forcible felony exception does not constitute fundamental error. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to discharge counsel when two prior hearings had already been held on the identical issue and no new information was presented that would change the outcome.


Headnotes

[1] A jury instruction on the forcible felony exception to the justifiable use of deadly force does not constitute fundamental error if properly given.

[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in summarily denying a renewed motion to discharge counsel when no new information is presented to the court that would affect…

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Key Quotes

“We conclude that the instruction does not constitute fundamental error.”

The court's holding that the jury instruction on the forcible felony exception to justifiable use of deadly force does not constitute fundamental error.

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Facts & Procedural History

Luxama was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, shooting into an occupied vehicle with a firearm, carjacki…

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Opinion of the Court
WARNER, J.

WARNER, J.

We affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences for second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, shooting into an occupied vehicle with a firearm, carjacking while in possession of a firearm, and two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. He claims that the court fundamentally erred in instructing the jury on the forcible felony exception to the justifiable use of deadly force. See Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2008). We conclude that the instruction does not constitute fundamental error. Farmer v. State, 975 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

As a second point, Luxama contends that the court erred in summarily denying his renewed motion to discharge his counsel without an evidentiary hearing. However, Luxama had twice before moved to discharge counsel, and twice the court held a hearing on the same issue and denied the motion. When a new judge assumed the case, Luxama’s counsel “certified” conflict because Luxama had filed a bar complaint against her. She informed the court of the prior hearings and denial of the motion to discharge which had been based upon the bar complaint. The successor judge also denied the motion after what appears to be a thorough review of the prior proceedings on the issue. “A trial court’s ruling denying a motion to discharge counsel will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Soto v. State, 751 So.2d 638, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion when two prior hearings had been held on the issue, and neither counsel nor Luxama presented any new information to the court that would affect the result.

Affirmed.

MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Brown v. State, 66 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …n for continuance is within the trial court’s discretion.” Wade v. State, 30 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “ ‘A trial court’s ruling denying a motion to discharge counsel will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.’ ” Luxama v. State, 1 So. 3d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Soto v. State, 751 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). A Nelson1 inquiry is unwarranted when a defendant is not seeking to discharge court-appointed counsel or to be represented by court-appointed counsel. Foste…
  • Luxama v. Dep't of Corr. (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

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