VANETTE WEBB AND LAURA L. WHITESIDE, APPELLANTS,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF ESCAMBIA COUNTY, APPELLEE
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A school board employee sought reimbursement for legal defense costs related to criminal charges arising from her official duties. The trial court dismissed both her statutory and common law claims for lack of jurisdiction, but the appellate court held that while the school board has jurisdiction over the statutory claim, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the common law claim for reimbursement.
The trial court properly recognized that the appellant was entitled to pursue both statutory and common law claims for fees, but erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the common law claim. The school board has jurisdiction only over the statutory claim, while the trial court retains jurisdiction over the common law claim because agencies have no common law jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction over common law claims even when a statutory claim for similar relief is also present.
[2] A statute does not abrogate a common law right unless the statute unequivocally states its intent to do so or is irreconcilably repugnant to the common law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The appellant's common law right to reimbursement is separate and apart from any statute.”
Establishes that common law rights exist independently of statutory provisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1998, Vanette Webb, an elected representative of the Escambia County School District, was criminally charged with violating the Public Records Act.…
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The appellant, Vanette Webb, seeks review of the trial court’s order dismissing her amended complaint against the appel-lee, the Escambia County School Board. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over her common law claim. We agree, affirming in part and reversing in part.
In 1998, the appellant, an elected representative of the Escambia County School District, was criminally charged with violating the Public Records Act. On May 31, 2007, the appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment determining that the case arose from the performance of her official duties, served a public purpose, and that the appellee was required to reimburse the fees and costs associated with her defense. The appellant asserted a statutory claim for fees pursuant to section 1012.26, Florida Statutes (2007), as well as a common law claim. In response, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 1012.26 eliminated the common law claim for fees and vested jurisdiction to determine fees with the appellee. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion, finding that the appellant was entitled to seek fees under both claims but that the appellee had jurisdiction to determine the appellant’s attorney’s fees.
Although the trial court properly determined that the appellant was entitled to pursue both her statutory and common law claims for fees, the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the appellant’s common law claim. The appellant’s common law right to reimbursement is separate and apart from any statute. See Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 917 (Fla.1990). There is a presumption that a statute makes no change in common law unless the statute unequivocally states that it does so or is so repugnant to common law that the two cannot co-exist. See id. at 918. In pertinent part, section 1012.26 states that:
Each district school board may provide legal services for officers and employees of the school board who are charged with civil or criminal actions arising out of and in the course of the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities. The district school board shall provide for reimbursement of reasonable expenses for legal services for officers and employees of school boards who are charged with civil or criminal actions arising out of and in the course of the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities upon successful defense by the employee or officer.
In the instant case, the language of the statute does not suggest that the statute was intended to abolish the common law right to reimbursement and it is not clear that the common law right and the statutory right cannot co-exist.
The language of section 1012.26 specifically gives the appellee the authority to consider any school board officer’s request for reimbursement of reasonable legal expenses pursuant to the statute. An agency, however, has no common law jurisdiction. See E. Cent. Reg’l Wastewater Facilities Operation Bd. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 659 So.2d 402, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The trial court, not the appel-lee, has jurisdiction to hear common law *1191claims. As such, although the trial court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s statutory claim, it erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s common law claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.
WOLF, DAVIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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Wyche v. State, 232 So. 3d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…e two cannot coexist, the statute will not be held to have changed the common law.” Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Townsend, 192 So. 3d at 1231; Webb v. Sch. Bd. of Escambia Cty., 1 So. 3d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The 2013 version of the feticide statute presents such a sequence of events. “The polestar of a statutory construction analysis is legislative intent.” W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012). To…
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Jackson v. The Sch. Bd. of Okaloosa Cnty. (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)…ls in performing their duties properly and diligently.” Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 917. Importantly, the common law right is “independent of statute, ordinance, or charter.” Id.; see also Lomelo, 423 So. 2d at 976; Webb v. Sch. Bd. of Escambia Cty., 1 So. 3d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (reaffirming that the common law right to reimbursement under Thornber “is separate and apart from any statute”). Separate from the common law right, section 112.44, Florida Statutes (2019), allows for fees in limited circ…
Authorities Cited
- Thornber v. City OF Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990)
- Rupert Wright v. State, 659 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- E. Cent. Reg'l Waste-Water Facilities Operation Bd. v. City OF W. Palm Beach & Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 659 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)