ROGER DESPOINTES AND FRANCOIS DESPOINTES, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF JACQUELINE D. HOYT, DECEASED, APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, INTERMATIC, INC.; PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY (CIGNA), AND INTERSCIENCE, INC., APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2008-12-17
No. 2D07-4687
KELLY, J., and GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.
2 So. 3d 360 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2008) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In this appeal of a partial final summary judgment, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that barred a plaintiff from recovering damages for property loss when the plaintiff had received insurance proceeds and been assigned her insurer's subrogation rights. The court held that Florida Statute section 768.76(1) unambiguously prohibits reduction for collateral sources when a subrogation right exists, even when the insurer assigns that right to the insured.


Holding

The court held that section 768.76(1) unambiguously prohibits reduction for collateral sources when a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. The statute contains no exception for situations where an insurer assigns its subrogation right to the insured. Therefore, Hoyt was entitled to pursue recovery of the $224,567.66 through her assigned subrogation claim.


Headnotes

[1] A tortfeasor cannot avoid liability for its alleged tort simply because the victim obtained insurance and the insurer assigned its subrogation rights to the victim.

[2] Under Florida law, there is no reduction for collateral sources when a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.

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Key Quotes

“Section 768.76(1) provides that "there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists."”

Establishes the statutory language at issue and its prohibition on reducing damages for collateral sources when subrogation rights exist.

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Facts & Procedural History

Jacqueline Hoyt's home suffered fire damage in 1997. Her insurer, CIGNA, paid her $224,567.66 for the property damage. CIGNA's policy included a subro…

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Opinion of the Court
WHATLEY, Judge.

WHATLEY, Judge.

In this appeal of a final judgment entered pursuant to a stipulation of the par*361ties,1 Roger Despointes and Francois Des-pointes, as personal representatives of the estate of Jacqueline Hoyt, challenge the partial final summary judgment entered in favor of Intermatic, Inc., on the issue of collateral source payments under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2007).2 We reverse.

Hoyt insured her home through a policy issued by Pacific Employer’s Insurance Company (hereinafter “CIGNA”). In 1997, Hoyt’s home suffered damages from a fire. She filed a claim with CIGNA, and CIGNA paid her $224,567.66 for the property damage caused by the fire.

The CIGNA policy provided for the right of subrogation against any third party recovery. CIGNA assigned its right of subrogation to Hoyt.3 Thereafter, Hoyt filed a complaint against Intermatic, alleging that the fire was caused by a defective surge protector manufactured by Inter-matic.4 Intermatic filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court entered a final partial summary judgment in its favor, finding that Hoyt was not entitled to recover the $224,567.66 that she had already recovered from her insurance company. The trial court erred in so finding.

As noted, the policy issued to Hoyt by CIGNA contained a right of subrogation, and CIGNA assigned that right of subro-gation to Hoyt. Thus, as Intermatic acknowledged in its motion for summary judgment, Hoyt stepped into the shoes of CIGNA to recover $224,567.66. Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” This provision of the statute is not ambiguous, and it does not contain an exception for situations such as this where the insurer chose to assign its right of subrogation to the insured, to whom it had already made payment under the policy of insurance. See Robarts v. Diaco, 581 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (noting in case involving assignment of right of contribution that “the assignment of the doctors’ rights of contribution in this case is not invalid merely because it was assigned to the original plaintiff in the tort action who may or may not have received full compensation for the injuries sustained by reason of the tort”). The trial court’s finding would allow the alleged tortfeasor to avoid paying for its alleged tort because the victim was prudent enough to obtain insurance.

*362Accordingly, we reverse the final partial summary judgment entered in favor of Intermatic.

KELLY, J., and GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.


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