SHELBY JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Shelby Jackson appealed his conviction for aggravated battery with a machete following a jury trial, raising challenges to his self-representation at trial. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial court's requirement that Jackson proceed pro se, the judge's trial conduct, or an unobserved prosecutorial comment on the burden of proof.
The trial court did not err in requiring Jackson to proceed pro se because his recalcitrance, antagonism, and personal attacks on successive court-appointed attorneys constituted a binding waiver or forfeiture of the right to counsel. The judge's interjections were motivated by appropriate interests in preserving trial regularity and were not skewed against the defendant. The prosecutor's unobserved comment on the burden of proof was not fundamental error and did not require reversal.
[1] A defendant's persistent recalcitrance, antagonism, and personal attacks upon court-appointed counsel can constitute a binding forfeiture or waiver of the right to counse…
[2] A trial judge's interjections motivated by an interest in preserving the orderliness of proceedings do not deprive a defendant of a fair trial unless they are skewed agai…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“his recalcitrance, antagonism and even personal attacks upon each of a lengthy series of court-appointed attorneys, all of whom were required to withdraw, rendered it obvious that he simply would not permit himself to be represented by anyone and amounted to a binding forfeiture or waiver of that right”
Establishes that Jackson's disruptive behavior toward successive counsel constituted an effective waiver of the right to representation, validating the trial court's decision to require self-representation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson was convicted of aggravated battery with a machete after a jury trial. Jackson represented himself at trial after a series of court-appointed …
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None of the points raised on this appeal from a conviction for aggravated battery (with a machete) after a jury trial presents reversible error. Discussing the most significant ones, which each stem from the indigent defendant’s self-representation at trial:
1. Although the attempted Faret-ta 1 inquiries may not have passed legal muster, see Tennis v. State, 997 So.2d 375 (Fla.2008); Austin v. State, 995 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the trial court did not err in requiring Jackson to proceed without counsel. This is because his recalcitrance, antagonism and even personal attacks upon each of a lengthy series of court-appointed attorneys, all of whom were required to withdraw, rendered it obvious that he simply would not permit himself to be represented by anyone and amounted to a binding forfeiture or waiver of that right. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir.1995); Foster v. Waimuright, 686 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 1209, 75 L.Ed.2d 449 (1983); State v. Young, 626 So.2d 655 (Fla.1993); Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253 (Fla.1984).
2. What the appellant characterizes as self-initiated “interjections” by the trial judge were motivated by the judge’s appropriate interest in preserving the regularity and orderliness of the proceeding. See Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 4, 9 (Fla.1992); Baisden v. State, 203 So.2d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). More importantly, they were not skewed against the defendant and thus did not deprive him of a fair trial, so as to require a new one. See Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla.1980); Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So.2d 108, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring), and cases collected, review denied, 848 So.2d 1154 (Fla.2003).
3. An erroneous comment by the prosecutor as to the burden of proof was not objected to and was not fundamental error. See Montanye v. State, 976 So.2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Kuiken v. State, 16 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Jackson v. State, 2 So. 3d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Bloodsaw v. State, 949 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Cf. Rodriguez v. State, 982 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). See also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006).…
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Bowden v. State, 150 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A. 2d 246 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (affirming forfeiture of counsel where a defendant was abusive and threatening toward, five appointed attorneys). There is very little case law in Florida, but in Jackson v. State, 2 So. 3d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), the Third District held, Although the attempted Faretta inquiries may not have passed legal muster ... the trial court did not err in requiring Jackson to proceed without counsel. This is because his recalcitrance, antagon…
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Shaw v. State, 43 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…[*150] PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 90.108(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); Jackson v. State, 2 So. 3d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (15 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1970)
- Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1984)
- Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1980)
- Gabby Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2008)
- Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992)
- State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993)
- Baisden v. State, 203 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Kopel v. Bernardo Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- United States v. McLEOD, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995)