CHRISTIAN CLEMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2009-01-07
No. 2D08-1523
NORTHCUTT, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.
3 So. 3d 364 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Christian Clemons appealed the denial of his postconviction relief motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the postconviction motion while Clemons' direct appeal from his convictions was pending.


Holding

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the Rule 3.850 motion because Clemons' direct appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction over collateral matters in the case. A timely motion to withdraw plea delays rendition of judgment until a signed written order is filed, and appellate jurisdiction vested when that order was rendered on March 7, 2008.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief when a direct appeal of the judgment and sentence from which the motion arises is pending.

[2] A timely motion to withdraw a plea delays the rendition of a defendant's judgment and sentence until the trial court enters a signed, written order disposing of the motio…

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Key Quotes

“Generally, the direct appeal of a defendant's judgment and sentence divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief in the case from which the appeal has been taken.”

Establishes the core jurisdictional principle that trial courts lose jurisdiction over postconviction matters once a direct appeal is pending.

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Facts & Procedural History

Clemons pleaded guilty to sale or delivery of hydrocodone and diazepam in August 2006. Within thirty days, his attorney filed a timely motion to withd…

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Opinion of the Court
KHOUZAM, Judge.

*365KHOUZAM, Judge.

Christian Clemons appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the rule 3.850 motion in light of Clemons’ pending appeal from his convictions, we reverse and remand.

Clemons entered a plea to sale or delivery of hydrocodone and sale or delivery of diazepam for offenses that occurred in August 2006. Within thirty days of the entry of the judgment and sentences on Clemons’ plea, his attorney filed a timely motion to withdraw plea that was denied. After the motion was orally denied, but prior to the rendition of a written order, Clemons filed a notice of appeal — the written order-denying Clemons’ motion to withdraw plea was ultimately rendered on March 7, 2008. The appeal is currently pending before this court in case number 2D08-286.

Shortly after filing with this court the notice of appeal in case number 2D08-286 Clemons filed with the trial court the rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief that is the subject of this appeal. In his rule 3.850 motion Clemons collaterally challenged his convictions. In an order rendered on March 17, 2008, during the pen-dency of the related appeal, the trial court summarily denied Clemons’ motion for postconviction relief.

Generally, the direct appeal of a defendant’s judgment and sentence divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief in the case from which the appeal has been taken. See Ortiz v. State, 768 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). A timely motion to withdraw plea delays rendition of a defendant’s judgment and sentence until the trial court *366files a signed, written order disposing of the motion. See Wofford v. State, 866 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (granting belated appeal to proceed as seeking review of the underlying judgment and sentence for which rendition was postponed pending order denying defendant’s timely motion to withdraw plea); see also Haber v. State, 961 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (recognizing principle in regard to issue concerning whether subsequent rule 3.850 motion was timely). Clemons’ appeal following the oral denial of his motion to withdraw plea was premature. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h)(3). However, this court’s jurisdiction vested upon the trial court’s rendition of the written order denying the motion to withdraw plea on March 7, 2008. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(l). Thus, on March 17, 2008, the date of rendition of the written order summarily denying Clemons’ motion for postconviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on this collateral matter.

We therefore reverse the order summarily denying Clemons’ rule 3.850 motion and remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the motion. Clemons may refile his motion when the direct appeal becomes final. See Ortiz, 768 So.2d at 1177-78.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Camon v. State, 57 So. 3d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case.... ’ Implicit in the rule is the requirement that the judgment and sentence be final before the motion is filed.”); see also Clemons v. State, 3 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“A timely motion to withdraw plea delays rendition of a defendant’s judgment and sentence until the trial court files a signed, written order disposing of the motion.”); Haber v. State, 961 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 200…
  • Kepford v. State, 64 So. 3d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …pford’s convictions and sentences. See Kegler v. State, 46 So. 3d 1061, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (recognizing that the challenge to the denial of a motion to withdraw plea after sentencing is by appeal of the judgment and sentence); Clemons v. State, 3 So. 3d 364, 365-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (stating that a timely motion to withdraw plea delays the rendition of the judgment and sentence until a signed, written order is filed that disposes of the motion). Kepford’s notice of appeal was timely filed within thirt…
  • Landell v. State, 88 So. 3d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
    …cate plea was pending and before the judgment had become final. “A timely motion to withdraw plea delays rendition of a defendant’s judgment and sentence until the trial court files a signed, written order disposing of the motion.” Clemons v. State, 3 So. 3d 364, 365-366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). It is [*415] improper to consider a Rule 3.850 motion before the underlying judgment is final. Camon v. State, 57 So. 3d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Even if it had been proper for the trial court to consider the motion, “[a…

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