M.M.F./ADOPTION ENTITY, APPELLANT,
v.
K.O., MOTHER OF J.O., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In an adoption case, the appellate court reversed a trial court's sua sponte order transferring venue of a termination of parental rights petition from Leon County to Taylor County. The reversal was based on the appellee's prior execution of a valid waiver of venue objection, which statutorily precluded the court from transferring venue without evidence that the waiver was invalid.
The trial court lacked authority to transfer venue under Florida Statute section 63.062(9) because the affected parent had previously executed a valid waiver of objection to venue. A waiver of objection to venue applies to statutory grounds for venue transfer and precludes transfer unless the court sets aside the waiver based on evidence of invalidity, which the trial court failed to do.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to sua sponte transfer venue of a petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption when a parent has executed a waiver of venue.
[2] A waiver of objection to venue encompasses and controls the ground of convenience as well as other statutory grounds to change venue.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a court may transfer venue of a petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption upon the objection of a parent whose consent is required for the adoption, "unless the objecting parent has previously executed a waiver of venue."”
Establishes the statutory limitation on the trial court's authority to transfer venue when a waiver exists
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant challenged a nonfinal order transferring venue of a petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption from Leon County to Tay…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Venue cases and more on FLexlaw
In this adoption case, Appellant challenges a nonfinal order in which the circuit court sua sponte transferred venue of a petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption from Leon County to Taylor County. We reverse the order.
*40Appellee previously executed a waiver of any objection to venue, but now argues that venue is proper in Taylor County. Appellee concedes, however, that the trial court erred by failing to first provide notice of its intent to change venue and then to hold a hearing on the proposed change. Thus, Appellee asserts that this court should reverse and remand with directions that the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing on the “court’s motion” to transfer venue.
We reverse the trial court’s order under section 63.062(9), Florida Statutes, because the trial court had no authority to enter the order. Section 63.062, Florida Statutes, provides that a court may transfer venue of a petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption upon the objection of a parent whose consent is required for the adoption, “unless the objecting parent has previously executed a waiver of venue.” § 63.062(9), Fla. Stat. Further, under section 63.087(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the affected parent must first object to the selected venue before a court may hold a hearing to determine the affected parent’s arguments contesting the petition to terminate parental rights.
We agree with Appellee that a waiver of objection to venue applies to the statutory codification of the principle of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Derrick & Assoc. Pathology, P.A. v. Kuehl, 617 So.2d 866, 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“[A] contractual waiver of venue privileges encompasses and controls the ground of convenience as ivell as other statutory grounds to change venue ....”) (emphasis added). Although the trial court expressed “concern” regarding the validity of Appellee’s waiver of objection to venue, it neither set aside the waiver nor considered any evidence to support a finding that the waiver was invalid. Consequently, we reverse the order transferring venue with directions to reinstate the petition for termination of parental rights pending adoption in the Circuit Court for Leon County.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Derrick & Assocs. Pathology, P.A. v. Gary V. Kuehl, M.D., 617 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)