W. A. SMITH
v.
TEXAS COMPANY
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In this action for recovery of an alleged gasoline refund, the trial court directed a verdict for the oil company defendant. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of the agent's authority to bind the company to a verbal refund agreement.
The trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to establish either express or implied authority on the agent's part to verbally bind the oil company to disburse money for the refund, and presented no proof of ratification of the alleged agreement by the company.
“neither express nor implied authority on the agent's part to verbally bind the oil company to disburse money from its treasury to pay back the amount involved, was shown, nor was any proof or ratification of this particular verbal agreement attempted”
Establishes the core requirement that plaintiff must prove the agent's authority or company ratification to bind the corporation to the verbal refund agreement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceW.A. Smith sued the Texas Company for $1,358.90, claiming it owed him a refund on gasoline purchased at one cent per gallon overcharge. Smith alleged …
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In an action at law the Court below directed a verdict for the defendant, which was an oil company being sued for the recovery of $1,358.90, alleged refund due on the price paid for gasoline, which plaintiff below contended the defendant had agreed to refund-because of a condition of collection, similar to the circumstances dealt with by this Court in the case of Gilmore v. Texas Company, 100 Fla. 169, 129 Sou. Rep. 587. This case, however, unlike the Gilmore case just cited, does not turn upon the construction of a written contract, but is based entirely upon an alleged verbal contract purported to have been made upon behalf of the oil company by one of its agents, and contingent upon the outcome of the Gilmore case. The oil company denied both the contract and the authority of its alleged agent to make it, if one was in fact made. The proof offered was not sufficient to take the case to the jury as against the defendant’s pleas, because neither express nor implied authority on the agent’s part to verbally bind the oil company to disburse money from its treasury to pay back the amount involved, was shown, nor was any proof or ratification of this particular verbal agreement attempted *764to the extent of making it appear that the company had ever accepted any special consideration for such an undertaking as plaintiff relied on as the basis for his recovery of the alleged overcharge of one cent per gallon on the gasoline sold to him for purpose of dispensing same outside the City of Pensacola, where it was not subject to the city tax on it.
It follows then that the Court below will not be reversed for taking the case from the jury, although the'question of agency in cases like this is ordinarily a jury proposition which should not be lightly taken from them by the court, when there is any substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to support the. agency relied on. Bush Grocery Co. v. Conely, 61 Fla. 131, 55 So. Rep. 867. But compare: Chase & Co. v. Miller, 81 Fla. 472, 88 Sou. Rep. 312.
Plaintiff in error’s request for oral argument, not presented in the form required by the rules of this Court, but simply mentioned in the concluding portion of plaintiff in error’s brief, is not sufficient to warrant us in placing the cause on the oral argument calendar for argument. The time available for consideration of that calendar whereon many important cases are waiting their turn to be heard, does not permit us to relax to any substantial degree the rule prescribed for requesting the privilege of having cases orally argued before this Court. We mention this fact, not in criticism of either of the counsel in this case, but in order that the members of the bar may be advised of the absolute necessity of having requests for oral argument presented in the manner provided by the rules, (1) in order that they might not be overlooked by the clerk, who has not the time to read the briefs in the case in search for requests for oral argument therein contained, and (2) in order that the Court may assign cases for oral argument in *765an orderly way. See: McLeod v. Citizens Bank, 61 Fla. 350, 56 Sou. Rep. 190; Carter v. State, 68 Fla. 143, 148, 66 Sou. Rep. 1000.
Judgment affirmed.
Whitfield, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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Am. Ladder & Scaffold Co., Inc. v. Miami Ventilated Awning MFG. Co., Inc., 161 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…ed or apparent, was such as to make the indemnity contract effective and binding on defendant was a genuine, material issue for jury determination on proper instructions. See T. G. Bush Grocery Co. v. Conely, supra; Smith v. Texas Co., 111 Fla. 762, 149 So. 585; Florida National Bank at Orlando v. Bolena, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 436. For the reasons stated the summary judgment appealed from is reversed. Reversed. . The record discloses the several defendants were merged into Miami Ventilated Awning Man…
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McCABE v. Howard, 281 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…of an agency may be shown by any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial and the fact of an agency is a jury question. Financial Fire & Cas. Co. v. Southmost Vegetable Co-op. Assoc., 212 So. 2d 69, (3d D.C.A.1968); Smith v. Texas Co., 111 Fla. 762, 149 So. 585 (1933). The mere existence of a fiduciary relationship between a corporation and its president, although very important, would not in and of itself be sufficient to pose a question of the fact of an agency for a jury. However, this, in…
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Ngoc T. Phan v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. for First Franklin Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-FF11, 198 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…2d DCA 1973) (“The existence of an agency [relationship] may be shown by any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial.” (citing Fin. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Southmost Vegetable Co-op. Ass’n, 212 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Smith v. Texas, 111 Fla. 762, 149 So. 585 (1933))). . At the trial, Ms. Kavalary testified and provided documentary evidence that Wells Fargo held Ms. Phan’s note on behalf of Deutsche Bank, its principal, at the time Deutsche Bank filed the complaint. And it was clear from th…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chase & Co. v. Miller, 81 Fla. 472 (Fla. 1921)
- T. G. Bush Grocery Co. v. Conely, 61 Fla. 131 (Fla. 1911)
- McLeod v. The Citizens Bank of Live Oak, 61 Fla. 350 (Fla. 1911)
- Carter v. State, 68 Fla. 143 (Fla. 1914)
- Gilmore v. The Tex. Co., 100 Fla. 169 (Fla. 1930)