GLENN LOUIS MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a special jury instruction defining "maliciously" as disregarding an injunction effectively removed an element of aggravated stalking, thereby prejudicing the defendant.
[1] A special jury instruction that effectively removes an element of a statutory offense from the jury's consideration constitutes reversible error.
[2] The statutory definition of aggravated stalking requires proof that the defendant acted knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly to harass another person.
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Glenn Louis Miller appeals, among other things, his conviction for aggravated stalking and the resulting five-year sentence, arguing the trial court erred when giving special jury instructions to define aggravated stalking. A special instruction the trial court added to the (then) standard instruction effectively read an element out of the statutory definition, appellant maintains, and we agree. We reverse the aggravated stalking conviction and sentence on that basis.
Mr. Miller was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides, in relevant part:
Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or that person’s property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, wnd, repeatedly ... harasses ... another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Id. (emphasis supplied). At issue is the trial court’s definition of “maliciously” in a case in which the prosecutor described the defendant’s conduct as “extreme niceness.”
When the learned trial court instructed the jury, he did not have the benefit of the supreme court’s subsequent elucidation (on *733October 30, 2008) of the definition of “maliciously” in this context. At the time of Mr. Miller’s trial, the standard instruction on aggravated stalking read, in pertinent part:
To prove the crime of Aggravated Stalking, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ... [harassed] ... (victim).
2. At the time of the ... [harassing]
a. an injunction for protection against ... [domestic] violence had been entered against (defendant) for the benefit of (victim).
3. (Defendant) knew that the [injunction] [court-imposed prohibition of conduct] had been entered against [him]....
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 8.7(b) (2007) (boldface omitted). Only after the trial was the standard instruction on aggravated stalking amended to define “ ‘[m]aliciously’ [as] wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse.” In re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases — Report No. 2008-01, 995 So.2d 476, 478 (Fla. 2008).
At trial, the prosecutor requested, and the trial court gave, the following additional special instruction, despite defense counsel’s objection to any deviation from the standard jury instruction:
Malice may be inferred when a defendant disregards an injunction for protection against domestic violence!’[*]
The trial court thus instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of acting maliciously even if it found only that he acted in disregard of an injunction.
The special instruction effectively eliminated the element of malice the State had the burden to prove. The statute requires more than simple disregard of an injunction. The statute does contemplate “disregard” in the sense of acting knowingly and willfully, despite a judicial prohibition, but it also contemplates “malicious” harassment. See § 784.048(4), Fla. Stat. (2007) (“knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ... harassing]”). Defining “maliciously” as acting merely in disregard of an injunction eradicated the need for any proof of acting “wrongfully,” apart from violating the injunction, and greatly lessened the state’s burden of proof.
We reverse the aggravated stalking conviction and sentence, remand for retrial on the aggravated stalking count under the revised standard instructions, and affirm otherwise.
WOLF and BROWNING, JJ., concur.
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Williams v. State, 184 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…ersing because erroneous instruction eliminated the defendant’s only defense); Zama v. State, 54 So. 3d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (reversing because a misleading response to a jury’s question broadened the bases for liability); Miller v. State, 4 So. 3d 732, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (reversing because a special instruction effectively eliminated an element of the offense the State had to prove); McWhorter v. State, 971 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (reversing because the jury instructions misstate…
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Authorities Cited
- In re Standard Jury Instructions IN Crim. Cases-Report NO. 2008-04, 995 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2008)
- McKINNON v. State, 712 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)