ROBERT GIELCHINSKY, PETITIONER,
v.
VIBO CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, D/B/A GENERAL TOBACCO, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a special magistrate's services require the consent of both parties, and if one party withdraws consent for good cause, the services must be dispensed with.
The parties initially agreed to a special magistrate for discovery. Petitioner later withdrew his consent due to financial reasons and moved to dispen…
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Robert Gielchinsky (“Gielchinsky”) petitions this Court for writ of certiorari and/or mandamus to quash the trial court’s order denying his motion to dispense with special magistrate services. We grant the petition and quash the order.
Previously, both parties agreed to the appointment of a special magistrate to conduct discovery. After a great deal of discovery under the auspices of the special magistrate, Gielchinsky no longer sought, or agreed to the continuing special magistrate services. Ultimately, Gielchinsky withdrew his consent to have a special magistrate and moved to dispense with the special magistrate’s services.
Consent of the parties is required to refer any matter to a special magistrate. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.490(c). See also Pesut v. Miller, 773 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Miller v. Lifshutz, 558 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Concomitantly, if a party withdraws his consent, as Giel-chinsky did here with good cause due to financial reasons, then it logically follows that the matter is no longer appropriate for a special magistrate.
Accordingly, we grant the petition, and quash the trial court’s order denying the motion to dispense with special magistrate services.
Petition granted, order quashed.
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August Urbanek v. Hopkins, 65 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…l Procedure 1.490(c) the trial court may not refer a matter to a magistrate, either general or special, without the consent of all of the parties. Washington Park Props., LLC v. Estrada, 996 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Gielchinsky v. Vibo Corp., 5 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). We grant the petition and direct the trial court to vacate its order of referral to the special master. Petition granted, order quashed. POLEN, STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.…
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Joara Freight Lines, Inc. v. Perez, 160 So. 3d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…ial, without the consent of the parties.” Because a referral to a special magistrate requires the consent of the parties, a trial court has a duty to refrain from appointing a special master absent this consent. See, e.g., Gielchinsky v. Vibo Corp., 5 So. 3d 785, 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Garcia v. Garcia, 958 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Pesut v. Miller, 773 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Hanor v. Hinckley, 584 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Taylor v. Taylor, 569 So. 2d 1389, 1389 (Fla.…
Authorities Cited
- Pesut v. Miller, 773 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Tanfield C. Miller v. Lifshutz, 558 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)