PAUL FELL, APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY A. CARLIN AND KENNETH CARLIN, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2009-04-17
No. 2D07-2921
FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.
6 So. 3d 119 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2009) Caution
Cited by 32 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of injury causation, as a jury could reasonably disbelieve expert testimony based on subjective complaints.


Headnotes

[1] A jury may reject uncontroverted expert medical testimony if there is a reasonable basis to do so, such as conflicting lay testimony.

[2] A motion for directed verdict should be granted only when no view of the evidence or inferences therefrom could support a verdict for the nonmoving party.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff, a passenger in a rear-end collision, sued the defendants who admitted fault. The plaintiff sought a directed verdict on injury causatio…

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Opinion of the Court
KELLY, Judge.

KELLY, Judge.

Paul Fell appeals the final judgment entered against him in a personal injury action. Fell was a back-seat pas*120senger in a Chevrolet Blazer involved in a rear-end collision in which the defendants, Nancy and Kenneth Carlin, admitted fault. On appeal, Fell contends the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor on the issue of whether he sustained an injury caused by the accident.1 After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly denied Fell’s motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.

The standard of review on appeal of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict is de novo in which we apply the same test used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Sims v. Cristinzio, 898 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of the evidence, or inferences made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmov-ing party. In considering a motion for directed verdict, the court must evaluate the testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and every reasonable inference deduced from the evidence must be indulged in favor of the nonmoving party. If there are conflicts in the evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.

Id. at 1005 (citations omitted). Fell argues he was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of whether he had sustained an injury as a result of the accident because every physician who testified at trial, including the physician who testified for the defense, opined that he had. While accurate, Fell’s argument overlooks the fact that a jury may reject even uncontroverted expert medical testimony provided it has a reasonable basis to do so, such as where there is conflicting lay testimony. See Weygant v. Ft. Myers Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 640 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla.1994); Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So.2d 495, 498 (Fla.1993).

Here, the jury heard testimony that would have provided it with a reasonable basis to reject the medical experts’ opinions that Fell had an injury caused by the accident. The medical opinions regarding Fell’s injury were based on his subjective complaints of pain. Accordingly, the validity of those opinions depended on Fell’s candor in reporting his complaints. In particular, the Carlins’ medical expert testified that while he believed Fell had sustained a soft tissue injury that was not permanent, his opinion was a “benefit of the doubt” diagnosis. He explained that *121this meant he based his opinion on Fell’s subjective complaints of pain which he assumed were truthful; however, if they were not truthful, his opinion would not be valid. Thus, if the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude Fell was not candid with his doctors, it also had a basis to reject them opinions regarding whether he was injured as a result of the accident.

We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Carlins, provided the jury with a reasonable basis to conclude that Fell was not candid with his doctors. Among other things, the evidence showed the following: the impact was so minor neither vehicle sustained visible property damage; Fell did not seek emergency medical treatment although he later claimed to have experienced pain and stiffness immediately after the impact; two days after the accident Fell went to a previously scheduled doctor’s appointment and never mentioned the accident, did not note any back or neck pain on the patient history form, did not complain of pain or stiffness, and did not exhibit symptoms of pain or injury during his physical examination; Fell did not miss any work and did not complain of pain at work; and as time passed, Fell gave increasing estimates of the speed of the Carlins’ car while admitting at trial that he had not seen the car before impact. In light of this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Fell had not been injured in the accident and that he had not been candid with his physicians. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Fell’s motion for directed verdict and allowed this issue to go to the jury.

Affirmed.

FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By (20 total)

  • Jackson Hewitt, Inc. v. Kaman, 100 So. 3d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …ency. The Kamans’ arguments on the cross-appeal are without merit and do not warrant further discussion. IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW We apply the de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict. Fell v. Carlin, 6 So. 3d 119, 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). In our review, we apply the same test that the trial court applies in ruling on the motion. Id. This court has previously stated this test as follows: A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of th…
  • Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 124 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …n on un-controverted issues, provided it has a reasonable basis to do so, such as where there is conflicting lay testimony. See Weygant v. Ft. Myers Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 640 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla.1994); Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 498; Fell v. Carlin, 6 So. 3d 119, 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[I]f the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude Fell was not candid with his doctors, it also had a basis to reject their opinions about whether he was injured as a result of the accident.”). The law is also well-settled t…
  • GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. HOY, 136 So. 3d 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …nce with its motion for directed verdict. Our ruling on this issue moots the remaining issues raised by GEI-CO on its direct appeal. We apply the de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict. Fell v. Carlin, 6 So. 3d 119, 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). In our review, we apply the same test that the trial court applies in ruling on the motion. Id. This court has previously stated this test as follows: A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of th…

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