LAWRENCE DEWAYNE SLOCUM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lawrence Slocum appeals his thirty-year sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on a burglary of a conveyance with battery charge, arguing the offense does not qualify for PRR sentencing. The court agrees, reversing the PRR sentence for count two while affirming the conviction and the sentence for count one.
Burglary of a conveyance with battery does not constitute a forcible felony for PRR sentencing purposes. For an offense to qualify as a forcible felony under the PRR statute, the statutory elements of the offense itself must include the threat or use of physical force or violence; circumstances of the underlying crime are irrelevant.
[1] Burglary of a conveyance with battery is not a qualifying offense for prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentencing under Florida Statutes section 775.082(9)(a)1.
[2] For an offense to qualify as a forcible felony for PRR sentencing, the statutory elements of the offense must include the threat or use of physical force or violence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for an offense to constitute a forcible felony under the PRR statute, "the statutory elements of the offense must include the threat or use of physical force or violence" and that the circumstances of the underlying crime are irrelevant”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining PRR qualifying offenses—elements-based rather than circumstance-based analysis
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSlocum was charged with robbery and burglary of a conveyance with battery on August 28, 2005. Following trial, a jury found him guilty of both counts.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Elements Of Offenses cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant, Lawrence D. Slocum, appeals his thirty-year sentence as a prison releas-ee reoffender (PRR) on count two, burglary of a conveyance with battery. Appellant argues that burglary of a conveyance with battery is not a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)l, Florida Statutes (2005). We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence Appellant as to count two. We affirm Appellant’s judgment on both counts and his sentence for count one.
Appellant was charged with committing robbery and burglary of a conveyance with battery on August 28, 2005. Following trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts as charged. At sentencing, the State argued that Appellant qualified for PRR sentencing for both counts. Appellant contended that burglary of a conveyance with battery was not a predicate offense to PRR sentencing under the statute. The trial court agreed with the State, reasoning that burglary with battery would fall under the catch-all provision of section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, which includes “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” The trial court sentenced Appellant as a PRR on both counts. Appellant received a fifteen-year sentence for count one and a thirty-year sentence for count two, to run consecutively.
Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, burglary of a conveyance with battery does not constitute a forcible felony for the purpose of PRR sentencing. See Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In Tumblin, the Fourth District held that for an offense to constitute a forcible felony under the PRR statute, “the statutory elements of the offense must include the threat or use of physical force or violence” and that the circumstances of the underlying crime are irrelevant. Id. (citing State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 213-17 (Fla.2007)). The Tum-blin court explained that burglary with an assault or battery “could be committed by an unlawful touching during a burglary and does not necessarily include the threat or use of physical force or violence,” so the defendant “could not be sentenced as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2000) 1." Id. at 356.
We agree with the reasoning in Tumblin and, therefore, find that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant as a PRR *576for count two. Accordingly, we REVERSE Appellant’s sentence for count two and REMAND for resentencing on count two. Otherwise, we AFFIRM.
WEBSTER, BROWNING, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…mplated by the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, Gor-ham’s ... sentence as a PRR is illegal.” 988 So. 2d at 154. This analysis might conclude here in Wilson’s favor, but significant inconsistencies have recently emerged. In Slocum v. [*334] State, 7 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the First District, relying on Tum-blin, held that burglary of a conveyance with battery only was not a forcible felony and thus did not qualify a defendant for PRR sentencing. Subsequently, in Shaw v. State, 26 So. 3d 51,…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)
- Tavorris Tumblin v. State, 965 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)