STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD PHILIP HEBERT, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence from a traffic stop, arguing the court applied the wrong legal standard. The Fourth District reverses, holding that the trial court erred by determining whether an actual violation occurred rather than whether the officer had probable cause to believe a violation had occurred.
The trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. The correct test is whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis and probable cause to believe an offense was committed, not whether the defendant actually violated the statute. The case is reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard.
[1] A traffic stop is constitutionally valid if the officer initiating the stop had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a traffic violation had occurred.
[2] Probable cause for a traffic stop exists when the totality of the facts known to the officer would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense has been committed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the 'correct test to be applied is whether the particular officer who initiated the traffic stop had an objectively reasonable basis for making the stop.'”
Establishes the proper legal standard for evaluating the constitutional validity of a traffic stop, focusing on the officer's basis for the stop rather than whether a violation actually occurred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Florida Highway Patrol sergeant observed a northbound vehicle make a left turn in front of southbound traffic at a green light, forcing vehicles to …
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Appellant, the State of Florida, appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee, Richard Hebert’s, motion to suppress. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A).
While on patrol in Vero Beach, a sergeant of the Florida Highway Patrol was stopped at a traffic light on a six-lane divided highway facing south. The light turned green allowing southbound traffic to proceed through the intersection. As southbound traffic began to move through the intersection, the sergeant saw a northbound vehicle make a left turn cutting in front of the southbound vehicles, forcing everyone to slam on their brakes and nearly causing a collision with one vehicle. The sergeant pulled the vehicle over, and upon running the driver’s license discovered that the license had been permanently revoked.
Hebert was charged with driving while his license was permanently revoked and filed a motion to suppress his identity arguing that the sergeant did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. At the hearing on Hebert’s motion to suppress, the sergeant testified that he had no way of knowing whether the offending vehicle had a green arrow or not when the driver initiated the turn because he could not see the light for northbound traffic. However, the sergeant was certain that the light for southbound traffic was green. Both Hebert and his wife testified that the arrow was green when he made the turn.
The trial court granted Hebert’s motion to suppress and found that, although the *395sergeant s testimony was credible, there was “honest doubt as to whether or not the defendant violated” the applicable statute.1 The State now timely appeals.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a presumption of correctness on appeal, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. State v. Manuel, 796 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). At the same time, legal issues such as the legal standard applied by the trial court are reviewed de novo. State v. Young, 971 So.2d 968, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In order to determine the constitutional validity of a traffic stop, the “correct test to be applied is whether the particular officer who initiated the traffic stop had an objectively reasonable basis for making the stop.” Id. (quoting Dobrin v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So.2d 1171, 1174 (Fla.2004)). Probable cause exists where the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed. State v. Walker, 991 So.2d 928, 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
In State v. Wimberly, police officers stopped a vehicle because they believed the windows were illegally tinted. 988 So.2d 116, 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). After testimony proved that the window tint was legal, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress concluding that because the window tint was legal, the police officers had no reason to stop the vehicle. Id. at 119. The Fifth District reversed the trial court finding it had applied the wrong standard in granting defendant’s motion to suppress because it had determined whether there was an actual violation instead of whether the officers had probable cause to believe there had been a violation. Id. at 119-20.
In the present case, the trial court expressed it had an honest doubt as to whether or not the defendant violated the applicable statute and never determined whether the sergeant had probable cause to stop Hebert’s vehicle. Therefore, the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Gonzalez v. State, 59 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ust interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain in the trial court’s ruling.’” Kurecka v. State, — So. 3d -, -, 2010 WL 3766727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting State v. Hebert, 8 So. 3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “When considering a motion to suppress, a court is required to consider the ‘totality of [the] circumstances’ that led to the discovery of evidence.” State v. Hendrex, 865 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing State v…
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Union Carbide Corp. v. Aubin, 97 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…Aubin’s claims are governed by the Third Restatement. A trial court’s determination regarding the legal standard that governs a case is reviewed de novo. Dep’t of Revenue Poynter v. Bunnell, 51 So. 3d 543, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); State v. Hebert, 8 So. 3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). A review of the record and the case law reveals that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that Aubin’s claims are governed by Sections 388 and 402 of the Second Restatement. In Kohler, this Court adopted…
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Kerick van Teamer v. State, 108 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)). “Probable cause exists where the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed.” State v. Hebert, 8 So. 3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing State v. Walker, 991 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). At the very least, an officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver violated, is vio [*667] lating, or is about to violate a traff…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dobrin v. Fla. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004)
- State v. Manuel, 796 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- State v. Javonte L. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
- Soto v. State, 971 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Dortch v. McNEIL, 991 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)