CARL FARNAM, APPELLANT,
v.
U.S. SUGAR CORPORATION AND GALLAGHER BASSETT, APPELLEES
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Carl Farnam, a workers' compensation claimant, appealed a Judge of Compensation Claims' order denying benefits for a low back condition and refusing an independent medical examination for a repetitive trauma claim. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of benefits based on the workplace accidents no longer being a major contributing cause but reversed and remanded because the JCC improperly addressed the unripe repetitive trauma claim and incorrectly denied the IME request based on findings made outside her jurisdiction.
The court affirmed the JCC's rejection of the parties' stipulation regarding compensability of the low back condition because competent evidence supported the finding that workplace accidents were no longer the major contributing cause. However, the court reversed and remanded because the JCC erred as a matter of law by addressing the unripe repetitive trauma claim after acknowledging it was not before her, and by using erroneous findings on that claim to deny the requested independent medical examination.
[1] A Judge of Compensation Claims errs by ruling on a claim that has not been mediated and is not ripe for adjudication.
[2] A Judge of Compensation Claims errs by denying a request for an independent medical examination based on findings made on an issue not properly before the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 440.192(9), Florida Statutes, allows only claims that have been listed in a petition for benefits and mediated to be adjudicated by a JCC.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that claims must be mediated before adjudication by the JCC, making the repetitive trauma claim not ripe for hearing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant Carl Farnam filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for a low back condition allegedly caused by workplace accidents. Claimant asser…
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Claimant challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) order on three grounds. Claimant argues the JCC erred *42in (1) ruling on Claimant’s new claim for repetitive trauma after determining it was not ripe for hearing; (2) denying a request for an independent medical examination (IME) on the repetitive trauma claim based on her improper rulings concerning the claim; and (3) rejecting the parties’ stipulation regarding compensability of Claimant’s low back condition and need for treatment.
Our review indicates the JCC did not err in rejecting the parties’ stipulation because competent evidence supports the JCC’s finding that the workplace accidents were no longer the major contributing cause of Claimant’s low back condition. Consequently, we affirm on that issue. However, we conclude the JCC erred as a matter of law by addressing the new repetitive trauma claim after acknowledging it was not ripe and the issue was not properly before her, and by relying on her findings related to this claim to deny Claimant’s requested IME. Accordingly, we reverse and remand as to these issues.
Section 440.192(9), Florida Statutes, allows only claims that have been listed in a petition for benefits and mediated to be adjudicated by a JCC. Here, the claim for compensability of the back condition, based on a repetitive trauma theory, was the subject of a petition for benefits, but had not gone through the mediation process. The JCC correctly found the claim was not ripe for adjudication, and the petition for benefits based upon repetitive trauma was not before her. Consequently, the JCC erred in addressing whether repetitive trauma caused, to any degree, the low back condition. See Reynolds v. Skagfield Corp., 887 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding “the JCC improperly determined the compensability of claimant’s back condition because the issue was not before the JCC”).
Because the JCC erred in addressing the repetitive trauma claim, she erred in denying the IME. Section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes, allows for an IME when there is a dispute concerning compensability. Here, the E/C created a dispute by denying that Claimant’s back condition was caused by repetitive trauma. The JCC denied Claimant’s motion for an IME due to a lack of dispute based upon her findings regarding the lack of a causal relationship between Claimant’s low back injury and repetitive trauma. Because the JCC erred as a matter of law by making those findings when the issue was not before her, there was no competent, substantial evidence to support her finding that there was no dispute regarding Claimant’s entitlement to an IME.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WOLF, BENTON and BROWNING, JJ., concur.
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Simeon Salinas v. C.A.T. Concrete, LLC, 46 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…conflict with the proposition just stated. The first case relied upon by the majority, Farnam v. U.S. Sugar Corp., does indeed hold that a JCC did not err in rejecting a stipulation where competent substantial evidence supported a contrary finding. 9 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Notably absent from this decision, however, is any indication of the procedural posture of that case. For instance, did one or both of the parties seek relief from the stipulation? Did developments at trial unfold in such a way…1 / 2
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Salzman v. Eli Reyes, 198 So. 3d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…ent. Case law holds that “a JCC is not required to follow a stipulation which is refuted by competent substantial evidence ” (emphasis supplied). Salinas v. C.A.T. Concrete, LLC, 46 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing Farnam v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 9 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding JCC entitled to reject parties’ stipulation where CSE supports contrary: finding)). “However, stipulations should not be ignored or set aside, without a showing of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, or some other ba…
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Booher v. Perkins Rest. & Bakery/Risk Mgmt. Ltd., 11 So. 3d 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…ings. A JCC errs in determining an issue not before him. E.g., Reynolds v. Skagfield Corp., 887 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Claims that have not gone through the mediation process are not ripe for adjudication. Farnam v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 9 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). A JCC errs by addressing claims that are not ripe. Id. Here, the MCC of the need for surgery was not before the JCC because, as Claimant conceded at the final hearing, Claimant had not included this surgery in her petitio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reynolds v. Skagfield Corp., 887 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)