W. DEXTER DOUGLASS AND TERESE V. DOUGLASS, APPELLANTS,
v.
A.L. BUFORD, JR., APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a declaratory judgment in a contract dispute, finding that the trial court prematurely concluded the contract was unambiguous and failed to consider parol evidence or make necessary factual findings. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine the parties' intent through proper fact-finding.
The contract is ambiguous in material respects, parol evidence is necessary to ascertain the parties' intent, and the trial court erred in refusing to consider evidence beyond the written terms. The appellate court cannot make factual findings in the first instance, so the case must be remanded for the trial court to make necessary findings of fact.
[1] Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed de novo.
[2] When a contract is found to be ambiguous, resort to parol evidence is necessary to ascertain the parties' intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. We review questions of contractual ambiguity de novo.”
Establishes the standard of review for contractual ambiguity questions and that such determinations are reviewed de novo rather than for abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.L. Buford, Jr. sued for declaratory judgment in a contract dispute against W. Dexter Douglass and Terese V. Douglass. After Buford abandoned his mot…
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Before us is an appeal from a final declaratory judgment entered in a contract dispute. Once the appellee, A.L. Buford, Jr., the plaintiff below, abandoned his motion for summary judgment, the matter was set for non-jury trial. After a five-day trial, the trial court concluded that pertinent “contractual language” was “not ambiguous” and entered declaratory judgment on that basis.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. We review questions of contractual ambiguity de novo. See Centennial Mortgage, Inc. v. SG/SC, Ltd., 772 So.2d 564, 565-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In the instant case, we are persuaded that the contract is ambiguous in material respects and that resort to parol evidence is necessary in order to ascertain the parties’ intent. See, e.g., O’Neill v. Scher, 997 So.2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Castillo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 971 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Barnett v. Destiny Owners Ass’n, Inc., 856 So.2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Cleanco, Inc. v. Manor Inv. Co., 568 So.2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
The trial judge declined to consider any evidence other than the written terms of the contract(s), once he concluded there was no ambiguity, and did not make findings of fact on any topic, although much of the evidence adduced at trial was conflicting. Sitting as an appellate court, we are precluded from making factual findings ourselves in the first instance. See Farneth v. State, 945 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that an appellate court is not empowered to make findings of fact.”). See also In re Doe, 932 So.2d 278, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (‘Where ... orders do not contain sufficient findings of fact ..., appellate courts typically deem them incapable of meaningful review and they remand with directions to the issuing courts to make the necessary findings.” (citing Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Fla.1994))).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to take further evidence if necessary and, in any event, to make findings on all matters pertinent to the parties’ intent in entering into (and possibly amending) their agreements).
Reversed and remanded.
KAHN, BENTON, and BROWNING, JJ., concur.
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Baltazar Salazar and Walter Salazar Pest Control v. Hometeam Pest Def., Inc., 230 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…act. The trial court must make these findings. See Farneth v. State, 945 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that an appellate court is not empowered to make findings of fact.”); Douglass v. Buford, 9 So. 3d 636, 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); cf. Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999) (We recognize and honor the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.”). Correspondingly, we “can…
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Featured Props., LLC v. Blky, LLC, 65 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…tion has yet to be resolved, this issue is not ripe for review.”). Thus, we proceed only to address the first issue. “Sitting as an appellate court, we are precluded from making factual findings ourselves in the first instance.” Douglass v. Buford, 9 So. 3d 636, 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Farneth v. State, 945 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that an appellate court is not empowered to make findings of fact.”). Relatedly, we “cannot employ the tipsy coach…
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- Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1994)
- In re Petition of Jane DOE for a Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice of Termination of Pregnancy. Jane Doe, 932 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Centennial Mortg., Inc. v. SG/SC, Ltd., 772 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Farneth v. State, 945 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Castillo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. & State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 971 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Barnett v. Destiny Owners Ass'n, Inc., 856 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- O'Neill v. Scher, 997 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Cleanco, Inc. v. Manor Inv. Co., 568 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)