STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GARY FONTANE EVANS, APPELLEE
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The State appeals an order suppressing cocaine evidence found in Evans' vehicle after a traffic stop. The appellate court reverses, finding that Evans voluntarily consented to a vehicle search and that the suppression order was therefore improper.
Evans' consent to the vehicle search was voluntary based on the totality of circumstances. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress because the evidence was lawfully obtained through valid consent following a lawful traffic stop.
[1] A valid traffic stop does not, in itself, provide probable cause to search a vehicle.
[2] Consent to search a vehicle is voluntary when, under the totality of the circumstances, the individual is not under arrest or detained, and there is no evidence of coerci…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances when determining if an individual's consent to search was voluntary or coerced.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating voluntary consent to search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Quinn stopped Evans for failing to stop at a stop sign. Evans did not have a valid driver's license; his license had been suspended. After giv…
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The State of Florida appeals an order granting Gary Fontane Evans’ motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle after a valid traffic stop. We reverse because Evans gave police consent to search the vehicle.
Evans was charged with possession of cocaine and resisting an officer without violence. He filed a motion to suppress arguing that police did not have probable cause to search his vehicle and that his consent to search was not voluntary. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Edward Quinn testified that he stopped Evans for failing to stop at a stop sign. Evans did not have a license and explained that he was moving the car for his girlfriend. When Officer Quinn checked Evans’ name on his computer, it revealed that Evans’ license had been suspended. Officer Quinn gave Evans a verbal warning for driving with a suspended license and told him that he could not drive the car, that he would have to get someone with a license to move it, and that he was free to leave. However, as Evans was leaving, Officer Quinn asked Evans if there were any narcotics or weapons in the vehicle and Evans said there was not. Officer Quinn then asked Evans if he would have any problem if he looked in the vehi*769cle for narcotics or weapons, and Evans said no, he did not mind, and there was nothing in the car. After opening the driver’s door, Officer Quinn observed cocaine in the driver’s door handle. Evans did not present any evidence at the suppression hearing.
Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances when determining if an individual’s consent to search was voluntary or coerced. Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So.2d 592, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “Where the police have not engaged in illegal conduct, the State bears the burden of showing the voluntariness of a consent to search by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 598.
Some of the factors to consider in determining whether consent is voluntary or coerced include whether the person is under arrest or otherwise detained, the age, education, intelligence, or mental condition of the person giving consent which would evidence a vulnerable state, coercive circumstances, and conduct by law enforcement such as a show of force, other threatening conduct, a prolonged detention, or verbal threats. I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 586-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Here, Officer Quinn made a straightforward request to search the vehicle and Evans gave his consent to search. Evans was not in custody and had been told that he was free to leave. Further, there was no evidence that Evans’ background would make him vulnerable to believing he did not have the right to refuse consent, and there was no evidence of coercion by law enforcement. Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude that Evans’ consent to search the car was voluntary and that the motion to suppress should have been denied.
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Evans’ motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
KHOUZAM, J., and DAKAN, STEPHEN L., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.
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Ruiz v. State, 50 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…he time and place of the encounter, the number of police officers present, the officers’ words and actions, and the age, education, or mental condition of the person detained. Hardin v. State, 18 So. 3d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); State v. Evans, 9 So. 3d 767, 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). “[A] private home, as here, is an area where a person enjoys the highest reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment[.] [S]ee, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d…
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K.W. v. State, 183 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…er, the number of police officers present, the officers’ words and actions, and the age, education or mental condition of the person detained.” Ruiz, 50 So. 3d at 1231 (citing Hardin v. State, 18 So. 3d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); State v. Evans, 9 So. 3d 767, 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). Another consent consideration is whether the search is incidental to a consensual encounter or a seizure occurred, which again requires courts to look at the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a reasonable per…
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McGraw v. State, 245 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…e of the warrantless search to determine whether a conscious defendant's consent is freely and voluntarily given under the Fourth Amendment. See , e.g. , State v. Ojeda , 147 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ; Ruiz , 50 So. 3d at 1231 ; State v. Evans , 9 So. 3d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Smallwood v. State (Smallwood I ), 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Judge Gross dissented from our holding in this case. However, he concurs in the Court's decision to grant the motion to certify the question as one of great…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chapman v. State, 968 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)