S.B., A MINOR CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
CHARLES PARKINS, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ALACHUA REGIONAL JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2009-04-16
No. 1D09-1340
WOLF, KAHN, and BENTON, JJ., concur.
10 So. 3d 207 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A minor child petitioned for habeas corpus relief after being held in secure detention beyond the statutory 21-day limit without an adjudicatory hearing having commenced. The Florida appellate court granted the writ, holding that the trial court lacked statutory authority to extend juvenile detention beyond 21 days absent a commenced adjudicatory hearing, regardless of danger-to-community concerns.


Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in extending S.B.'s secure detention beyond the 21-day statutory limit. The State's power to detain juveniles is entirely statutory, and section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits such detention beyond 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing has been commenced in good faith. Danger to the community does not authorize continued detention beyond this statutory limit.


Headnotes

[1] A juvenile's detention is governed by statute, and courts must strictly comply with statutory provisions regarding detention limits.

[2] A juvenile may not be held in secure detention for more than 21 days on the same offense unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The State's power to detain juveniles charged with delinquent acts "is entirely statutory in nature."”

Establishes that juvenile detention authority derives solely from statute and is subject to strict compliance requirements.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

S.B. was charged with felony offenses in three separate petitions. After serving an initial 21-day detention period, he was released on January 1, 200…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

S.B. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was being unlawfully detained in secure detention beyond the 21-day statutory limit. We granted the writ by unpublished order and now issue this opinion to explain our decision.

S.B. has been charged in three separate petitions with felony offenses, which are in various procedural stages. After serving the 21-day statutory limit on his offenses, S.B. was released on January 1, 2009. All of S.B.’s cases were scheduled for hearing on February 12, 2009, but S.B. failed to appear for the hearing. He was thereafter taken into custody on February 19, 2009. Following a detention hearing, the trial court placed S.B. in secure detention again for 21 days, with a release date of March 12, 2009.

On March 12, 2009, the trial court reviewed S.B.’s detention status. Counsel for S.B. advised the court that the statutory time had expired and that S.B. should be released. The State essentially agreed that the 21-day time period had expired but requested further detention. The trial court placed S.B. in secure detention until April 9, 2009, stating: “Based on the dangers to the community and danger to the children and danger to everybody else, I’m going to order him to stay in detention until another Court tells me otherwise.”

The State’s power to detain juveniles charged with delinquent acts “is entirely statutory in nature.” W.C. v. Smith, 898 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Thus, courts must strictly comply with controlling statutory provisions. Id. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes (2008), prohibits the detention of a juvenile for more than 21 days on the same offense: “A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court.” Once a juvenile has been detained on an offense, “that juvenile cannot be placed back into detention on the same charge prior to an adjudicatory hearing on that charge.” A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

Here, the trial court had not commenced an adjudicatory hearing for any of S.B.’s cases. Thus, the trial court erred by holding S.B. in secure detention beyond the statutory limit based on the circumstances of his offenses and the court’s conclusion that S.B. posed a danger to the community. Counsel for respondent correctly acknowledges that the Legislature has not authorized continued secure detention of juveniles beyond the 21-day statutory time limit based on danger to the community.

PETITION GRANTED.

WOLF, KAHN, and BENTON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • R.N. v. State, 30 So. 3d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …er continuance of proceedings for the child or the state.” In this case the trial [*726] court has only determined the need for further continuance, not the separate inquiry concerning the continued need for detention. See generally S.B. v. Parkins, 10 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). We therefore grant the petition and direct the trial court to immediately conduct a hearing to consider the need for continued detention, apart from the need for a further continuance. Petition granted. DAMOORGIAN, CIKLIN and…
  • N. N. R. v. Grice (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)
    …cause for allowing the court to extend his home detention. Id. at 352. The legislature has expressed a policy of strictly controlling the detention of juveniles, and the detention of juveniles is governed entirely by statute. See S.B. v. Parkins, 10 So. 3d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); B.M. v. Dobuler, 979 So. 2d 308, 312, 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Section 985.24(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2022), which was numbered 985.24(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2021), at the time A.T. was decided, prohibits placement of a…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw