MICHAEL RICHARD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIA SUZETTE WILLIAMS, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's temporary alimony award as excessive because the combined child support and in-kind alimony obligation consumed 97% of the husband's net monthly income, leaving him virtually unable to support himself.
The court reversed the temporary alimony award, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering payments that exhausted or virtually exhausted the husband's income. The court affirmed the child support award but reversed the temporary in-kind alimony award and remanded for reconsideration of appropriate amounts.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by entering a temporary financial award that exceeds or nearly exhausts a party's income.
[2] In dissolution of marriage proceedings, a party's income and ability to pay are factors in determining the amount of temporary alimony and child support.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court cannot enter a temporary [financial] award that exceeds or nearly exhausts a party's income because it would abuse its discretion by doing so”
Establishes the governing legal standard that temporary support awards must not consume all or nearly all of a payor's income
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for nineteen years and have one fifteen-year-old child. The husband, a deputy sheriff, earns approximately $3,254 gross month…
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Michael Williams (husband) appeals a non-final order on temporary child support and alimony entered in an action for the dissolution of his marriage to Dania Williams (wife). We reverse the temporary alimony award as it is excessive.
This nineteen-year marriage produced one child, now fifteen years of age. The husband, a deputy sheriff, has a gross monthly income of approximately $3,254, including overtime and special duty pay. The wife’s gross income monthly income is $2,650 per month. The husband argues that the general magistrate abused his discretion when he recommended and the lower court ordered him to pay $ 685.63 per month in temporary child support and $1,947 per month as in-kind alimony to the wife.1 He contends that the temporary award is excessive as it equals 97% of his net income (and 81% of his gross income) as determined by the general magistrate.2
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, each party’s sources of income and ability to pay are factors to be considered in determining whether alimony, child support, or attorney’s fees are appropriate, and if so, in what amounts. Smith v. Smith, 737 So.2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). However, “a trial court cannot enter a temporary [financial] award that exceeds or nearly exhausts a party’s income” because it would abuse its discretion by doing so. Bolton v. Bolton, 898 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Here, the record supports the wife’s need for temporary alimony. However, the award of temporary child support and in-kind alimony is clearly excessive, as combined, it will consume 97% of the husband’s net monthly income. Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by order*653ing the husband to make payments that exhaust or virtually exhaust his income. See Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (reversing permanent alimony and child support awards that consumed 79% of husband’s net pay, and observing that “where the husband’s income is nearly exhausted on obligations imposed by the final judgment, leaving him with practically no money to support himself, reasonable persons could not differ as to the impropriety of the actions taken by the trial court”), disapproved on other grounds by Acker v. Acker, 904 So.2d 384 (Fla.2005); see also Squindo v. Osuna-Squin-do, 943 So.2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (reversing permanent alimony award that consumed approximately 70% of husband’s net monthly income and left former husband with $600 per month); Barclay v. Barclay, 554 So.2d 1191, 1191-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (reversing temporary alimony and child support award that required husband to pay $5,778 per month in obligations where husband only made $5,666 per month); Fields v. Fields, 533 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (reversing temporary alimony award where it exceeded husband’s net weekly salary); Sokol v. Sokol, 441 So.2d 682, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (reversing alimony, child support, and expense award that left husband with just $328 per month after payment of his obligations because it “simply consumes too large a share of the husband’s presumed ability to earn”); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 372 So.2d 178, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (holding alimony award was clearly excessive and constituted abuse of discretion where it consumed 96% of husband’s current income).
Because the amount of temporary in-kind alimony awarded is excessive, we reverse that award and remand for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ„ concur.
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Galligar v. Terrie Galligar, 77 So. 3d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…ty.”). It is well settled that a court abuses its discretion when it orders alimony payments in an amount that virtually exhausts the payor spouse’s income and leaves him with practically no money to support himself. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 10 So. 3d 651, 652-53 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (finding abuse of discretion where child support and alimony payment was 97% of husband’s net income); Squindo v. Osuna-Squindo, 943 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (reversing payment equaling 70% of net income); Genti…
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De La Piedra v. De La Piedra, 243 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…nt to pay direct alimony ($2,500/month), child support ($330.72/month), and other in-kind alimony payments to cover Appellee’s mortgage, medical and vehicle insurance, student loans, cell phone bills, and medical bills. See Williams v. Williams, 10 So. 3d 651, 652 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (treating mortgage payments on behalf of the other spouse as in-kind alimony). In addition, the temporary order requires Appellant to pay $10,500 towards Appellee’s attorney’s fees. Appellant claims that the court a…
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Wilder v. Wilder, 42 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…er that “exceeds or nearly exhausts a party’s income.” Bolton v. Bolton, 898 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing temporary support order that left husband with only $800 per month for own living expenses); see also Williams v. Williams, 10 So. 3d 651, 652-53 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (reversing award of temporary child support and “in-kind” alimony that consumed ninety-seven percent of husband’s monthly income). That is the case here as the husband’s financial obligations under the temporary support o…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Sokol v. Sokol, 441 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Acker v. Acker, 904 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2005)
- McCALL v. State, 737 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Smith v. Smith, 737 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Nicholson v. Glynn C. Nicholson, 372 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Barclay v. Barclay, 554 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Isadore Philips Bolton v. Bolton, 898 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Renato Bruno Squindo v. Osuna-Squindo, 943 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
- Fields v. Fields, 533 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)