THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
E.G., A JUVENILE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appeals a trial court's dismissal of a juvenile delinquency petition based on expiration of the ninety-day speedy trial period. The appellate court reverses, holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the petition without first giving the State a ten-day recapture period to proceed to trial as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090(m).
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition without first giving the State the opportunity to bring the juvenile to trial within ten days as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090(m). The proper remedy for expiration of the ninety-day speedy trial period is an order requiring trial within ten days, not immediate dismissal.
[1] A trial court errs by dismissing a petition against a juvenile for speedy trial violations without first affording the State a ten-day recapture period.
[2] A juvenile's speedy trial period may be extended by a ten-day recapture period when the ninety-day period expires.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the ninety-day speedy trial period expired, the trial court should have ordered appellee to be brought to trial within ten days. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m).”
Establishes the mandatory requirement that trial must be ordered within ten days when the speedy trial period expires, rather than immediate dismissal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceE.G., a juvenile, was charged with delinquency. The ninety-day speedy trial period expired before the adjudicatory hearing was held. The trial court g…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Recapture Period cases and more on FLexlaw
The State of Florida (“State”) appeals an order of the trial court that discharged a petition of delinquency filed against ap-pellee, E.G., a juvenile, because appellee’s ninety-day speedy trial period expired. We reverse.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial found that, pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090(d), the time period for holding the adjudicatory hearing had expired. The State asked the trial court to allow it the time period provided in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090(m).1 When the ninety-day *456speedy trial period expired, the trial court should have ordered appellee to be brought to trial within ten days. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m).
In the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss, the judge clearly set forth the ground for dismissal. In the order, the trial court wrote:
This Cause having come before the Court on the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition, hereby grants the Motion for the reasons set forth in the Agreed Statement of Facts of the proceeding that occurred in court on July 11, 2008, in front of the Honorable Mercedes Bach, who found that the speedy trial period had run (emphasis added).
Thus, the trial court unequivocally stated that it based its dismissal of charges on the Agreed Statement of Facts.2 Moreover, although appellee complains that it did not sign the agreed statement of facts, appellee’s counsel never voiced a single objection concerning those facts. Here, the record is absolutely clear that trial court based its dismissal of charges on the statement of facts before us. Those facts, when reviewed under Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m), require reversal as the trial court erred by dismissing the petition against appellee without first giving the State the ten-day recapture period to try the ease against appellee. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m); State v. M.M., 867 So.2d 439, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
We reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Vinson v. State, 867 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- State v. M.M., 867 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)