RAYMOND M. GOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Good appealed the revocation of his probation based solely on his arrest for DUI, where he admitted to the arrest but not the underlying offense and there was minimal evidence beyond the ticket itself. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot because Good absconded during his original probationary period after filing the appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal as moot under Griffis v. State because Good absconded during his original probationary term after filing the appeal. The court noted that while it recognized the merit-based issue regarding probation revocation based on arrest alone with minimal evidence, dismissal was appropriate because Good's absconsion rendered the appeal essentially moot.
[1] Probation cannot be revoked based solely on proof of an arrest during the probationary period where the sole condition assertedly violated was that the probationer "live…
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by finding a probation violation based on an arrest when the only evidence of the law violation is a ticket and the arresting officer…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“probation cannot be revoked based solely on proof of an arrest during the probationary period where the sole condition assertedly violated was that the probationer "live and remain at liberty without violating any law" and the only evidence of a violation was hearsay”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that probation revocation based on arrest alone, especially with only hearsay evidence, is improper
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGood pleaded nolo contendere to grand theft over $20,000 and was sentenced on July 30, 2007, to eighteen months of probation. He was subsequently char…
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This case began as an Anders appeal. Appellant’s underlying crime was grand theft over $20,000, a third-degree felony, to which he pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced on July 30, 2007, to eighteen months of probation. He was subsequently charged with violation of probation. The public defender was ordered to file a supplemental initial brief addressing whether reversible error was committed when Appellant’s probation was revoked due to his arrest for DUI. We cited Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978); Lockett v. State, 547 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), and Purvis v. State, 397 So.2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which stand, overall, for the proposition that probation cannot be revoked based solely on proof of an arrest during the probationary period where the sole condition assertedly violated was that the probationer “live and remain at liberty without violating any law” and the only evidence of a violation was hearsay.
Here, Appellant admitted that he was arrested for DUI and identified the ticket that he received. He did not admit to the DUI. There was no Breathalyzer test, no arrest affidavit, no video of Appellant’s behavior during the traffic stop or booking offered in evidence.1 The arresting officer did not testify. The only evidence of the law violation was the ticket. The trial court found that Appellant violated his probation based on the arrest and reinstated the probation and extended probation to five years. Without this violation, Appellant’s probationary period would have ended January 31, 2009.
In its response, the State urges that this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant is now a fugitive from justice, an arrest warrant having been issued for Appellant on December 12, 2008. Under Griffis v. State, 759 So.2d 668 (Fla.2000), if an appellant absconds after filing an appeal, the reviewing court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal. According to the State’s filing, Appellant absconded on or about December 12, 2008, and as of the date the State filed its response, February 18, 2009, he was still missing. Had Appellant gone missing after the end of his original term of probation, we would likely not dismiss the appeal; however, having elected to abscond during the original probationary term, this appeal is essentially *993moot. Accordingly, we elect to dismiss this appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
GRIFFIN, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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Guerrero v. State, 25 So. 3d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Griffis v. State, 759 So. 2d 668 (Fla.2000); Good v. State, 11 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). LEWIS, THOMAS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.…
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Curts v. State, 65 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Good v. State, 11 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Griffis v. State, 759 So. 2d 668 (Fla.2000). ORFINGER, C.J., PALMER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978)
- Robinson v. State, 907 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Robinson v. State, 609 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Purvis v. State, 397 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Griffis v. State, 759 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2000)
- Reyes v. State, 711 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Gordon v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 713 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Amador v. State, 713 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- ROY v. State, 547 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Lockett v. State, 547 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)