GAYNOR EARL TEDDER, JR., PETITIONER(S)

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT(S)

LEWIS, J., specially

concurring.

I fully agree with my colleagues that we lack jurisdiction to review Tedder v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D704, — So.3d-, 2008 WL 612313 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar.7, 2008), with regard to the license-retention issue. Our prior precedent in Burns v. State, 676 So.2d 1366, 1366 (Fla.1996), Kennedy v. Kennedy, 641 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla.1994), and Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. Branham, 104 So.2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958) (addressing analogous provision of the 1885 Florida Constitution as amended in 1956), mandates this conclusion. In those decisions, we explained that our discretionary conflict jurisdiction under article V, sections 3(b)(3) and 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution1 requires that the “decision” under review provide a judgment and decision endorsed by a majority of the district court of appeal. I write separately to more fully explain why the decision below does not meet this standard and, further, does not constitute Florida precedent.

In Tedder, the Second District did not provide a majority analysis with regard to the license-retention issue. See 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D705-06, — So.3d at -. Consequently, the relevant reasoning— which was endorsed by a single judge— may not supply conflict jurisdiction and, furthermore, is not Florida precedent. See, e.g., Kennedy, 641 So.2d at 409 (explaining that “this Court must look to [the] ‘opinion’ upon which the district court’s ‘decision’ is based to determine [the] probable existence of direct conflict,” and hold*198ing that “because the [supplied analysis] exists only in [an] isolated plurality opinion, the [asserted] doctrine should not be considered the law of this state ” (emphasis supplied)). The license-retention analysis provided below did not garner a majority or plurality vote;2 therefore, Florida appellate courts must presume that the trial court order was affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s reasoning, which is not appellate precedent in the Second District or any other district court of appeal. See, e.g., Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175, 181 (1926) (holding that a judgment issued by an equally divided court resolves the case on the grounds supplied by the lower court and does not establish precedent); State v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51, 52 (1904) (same).

Here, the pertinent portion of the district court’s “decision” (i.e., what two panel judges agreed upon)3 affirmed the denial of Tedder’s motion to suppress statements without providing any shared analysis. In contrast, the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal have provided persuasive majority decisions addressing substantially similar factual scenarios. See Brye v. State, 927 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Bama v. State, 636 So.2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Since we have not definitively addressed this type of totality-of-eircum-stances license-retention situation when coupled with a search or interrogation,4 the district-court decisions in Brye and Bama remain binding precedent throughout this state. See, e.g., Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla.1992) (holding that in the absence of inter-district conflict or contrary precedent from this Court, the decision of a district court of appeal is binding precedent throughout Florida).

For these reasons, I specially concur in the order denying review of Tedder v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D704, — So.3d -, 2008 WL 612313 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar.7, 2008).