KELVIN D. HARRIS, PETITIONER,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-07-09
No. 3D08-736
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and SUAREZ, JJ.
12 So. 3d 764 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Harris petitioned for habeas corpus relief, claiming his prior appellate decision constituted manifest injustice and disparate treatment of co-defendants. The court rejected his habeas petition, finding that inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not constitute disparate treatment and that his sentence was legal under Florida law.


Holding

Harris's habeas petition is denied. Inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not constitute disparate treatment warranting habeas relief. Harris's sentence was properly imposed because he was convicted of first-degree felonies punishable by life, not life felonies, and therefore was properly subject to habitual offender sentencing.


Headnotes

[1] Habeas corpus relief is appropriate to correct manifest injustice.

[2] Disparate treatment of co-defendants can constitute manifest injustice warranting habeas corpus relief.

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Key Quotes

“inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not constitute disparate treatment”

Establishes that Harris cannot rely on alleged inconsistencies with other cases to support a habeas claim

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Facts & Procedural History

Harris was convicted in 1990 of armed robbery and armed burglary of a conveyance and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to two concurrent life se…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for writ of habeas corpus, Kelvin D. Harris (“Harris”) asks this Court to reconsider its prior per curiam decision in Harris v. State, 974 So.2d 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“case number 3D07-1463”). Harris claims this Court’s opinion *765constitutes manifest injustice and disparate treatment. We deny the petition.

Initially, we must determine whether habeas relief is appropriate here. An appellate court should correct manifest injustice in habeas corpus proceedings. See e.g., Adams v. State, 957 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Further, disparate treatment of co-defendants can result in manifest injustice. See Williams v. State, 947 So.2d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Romero v. State, 637 So.2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not constitute disparate treatment. See Ousley v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrections, 269 Fed.Appx. 884, 886-88 (11th Cir.2008).

Harris claims disparate treatment based on allegedly inconsistent decisions of this Court in his case and other separate, unrelated cases. Thus, the claim is not for disparate treatment, and does not warrant habeas relief on that ground. Assuming arguendo that a manifest injustice claim for habeas relief is proper on other grounds, we have re-examined the original file in case number 3D07-1463, and conclude that Harris’ claims are without merit.

In 1990, Harris was convicted of armed robbery and armed burglary of a conveyance. The trial court sentenced Harris, as a habitual felony offender, to two concurrent life sentences. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Harris v. State, 594 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). In April 1995, Harris began challenging his sentence in various postconviction relief motions. The trial court denied all of these motions, and this Court affirmed. The latest appeal was case number 3D07-1463.

Harris contends that his sentence is illegal because it was imposed when life felonies were not subject to the habitual offender statute. See State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287 (Fla.2003). Harris, however, was not convicted for life felonies, but for first degree felonies punishable by life. Therefore, he was properly sentenced, as a habitual offender, to a life sentence. Pope v. State, 841 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Finding no manifest injustice or disparate treatment, we, therefore, deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Petition denied.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We grant Kelvin D. Harris’ (“Harris”) motion for rehearing in part, and deny in part.

Harris asserts that his written sentence on count one for robbery should be corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement. Harris is correct. The trial court orally sentenced Harris to sixty years in prison on count one. However, the written sentence shows a life sentence on this count.

Accordingly, we grant Harris’ petition in part, and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to correct the written sentence for count one to reflect the oral pronouncement of sixty years. Harris is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he is serving a concurrent life sentence on count two for burglary. See Velez v. State, 988 So.2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Rehearing granted in part; petition granted in part; remanded with instructions.

Other
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We grant Kelvin D. Harris’ (“Harris”) motion for rehearing in part, and deny in part.

Harris asserts that his written sentence on count one for robbery should be corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement. Harris is correct. The trial court orally sentenced Harris to sixty years in prison on count one. However, the written sentence shows a life sentence on this count.

Accordingly, we grant Harris’ petition in part, and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to correct the written sentence for count one to reflect the oral pronouncement of sixty years. Harris is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he is serving a concurrent life sentence on count two for burglary. See Velez v. State, 988 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Rehearing granted in part; petition granted in part; remanded with instructions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Lavoris Johnson v. State, 226 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
    …(Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reversing a sentence on appeal from the denial of a postconviction motion, finding that failure to do so would result in manifest injustice where the same relief was granted to a [*911] co-defendant and others); Harris v. State, 12 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (recognizing that “disparate treatment of co-defendants can result in manifest injustice,” although “inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not constitute disparate treatment”). To give relief to one co-defend…
  • Dickerson v. State, 204 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
    …t would be “manifestly unjust” if his case and the instant petition were treated any differently. Dickerson is correct that an appellate court has the authority to correct a “manifest injustice” by way of habeas corpus proceedings. Harris v. State, 12 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing Adams v. State, 957 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). However, Dickerson is not summarily entitled to relief based on our other opinions. Inconsistent decisions in separate, unrelated cases do not automatically [*546]…
  • Straitiff v. State, 228 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
    …econsider our earlier ruling on direct appeal. See Dickerson v. State, 204 So. 3d 544, 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (“[A]n appellate court has the authority to correct a ‘manifest injustice’ by way of habeas corpus proceedings.”) (citing Harris v. State, 12 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)). Accordingly, we vacate Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for solicitation and remand for resentencing based upon a corrected criminal punishment code score-sheet. See Pamblanco, 199 So. 3d at 507; Lashley v. State, 194 S…

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