WHITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
TIMOTHY JONES, APPELLEE
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White Construction Company appealed a judgment in favor of Timothy Jones in a breach of contract dispute arising from a 1992 mining license agreement. The court affirmed the judgment for Jones, holding that White's counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the implied duty to mine.
The court held that White's counterclaim was barred by Florida's five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims because the cause of action accrued in 1997 when White alleged Jones breached the agreement. The court also held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that when the real consideration for the lease is not totally dependent upon commencement and continuance of mining operations, the lessee incurs no implied duty to mine continuously.
[1] A counterclaim for breach of contract is barred by the statute of limitations if the cause of action accrued more than the statutory period before the counterclaim was fi…
[2] A party seeking review of a jury instruction must cite the instruction itself as the point of error, not the denial of a motion for directed verdict or summary judgment.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“White's cause of action for breach accrued in 1997; the statute of limitations barred the company's claim of breach some ten years later.”
Establishes that the statute of limitations began running when the breach occurred in 1997, barring White's counterclaim filed a decade later.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1992, Timothy Jones licensed White Construction Company to mine limerock deposits under Jones' property. In the subsequent lawsuit, both parties al…
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This case arises from a 1992 agreement by which Timothy Jones licensed White Construction Co. to mine limerock deposits under Jones’ property. In the present lawsuit litigated in the circuit court, each party alleged the other party breached the agreement. We affirm the final judgment for Jones and reject Jones’s argument on cross-appeal regarding White’s failure to mine the land continuously.
The trial court correctly determined that the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), barred White’s counterclaim for breach in this case. According to White’s own pleadings, arguments, and evidence at trial, the company’s case against Jones rested on the theory that Jones breached the mining agreement in 1997 — not that Jones anticipatorily repudiated his contractual obligations, as White argues on appeal. White’s cause of action for breach accrued in 1997; the statute of limitations barred the company’s claim of breach some ten years later. See Abbott Labs., Inc., v. Gen. Elec. Capital, 765 So.2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (discussing elements of breach).
We also reject Jones’s argument on cross-appeal that the trial court erred “by failing to find as a matter of law that White has an implied duty to mine with reasonable diligence.” We ascertain that Jones actually seeks review of a jury instruction, as his brief cites only a jury instruction on the subject as the juncture at which the trial court committed error, and not denial of a motion for directed verdict or for summary judgment. We find no abuse of discretion in the instruction at issue, which, almost word for word, tracked the extant rule in Florida that, when “the real consideration for the lease is totally dependent upon the commencement and continuance of mining operations by the lessee,” the lessee incurs an implied duty to mine. Deerfield Rock Corp. v. McClellan, 121 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). Accordingly, as other jurisdictions have held, when the consideration is not “totally dependent upon the commencement and continuance of mining operations,” as it was here, the lessee or licensee incurs no duty to mine continuously. See id.; accord Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385, 388 (1986); Clark v. Louisville-Lafayette Coal Co., 96 Colo. 420, 43 P.2d 386, 387 (1935); Haeffner v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 76 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Mo.1934); Weatherly v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 16 Tenn.App. 613, 65 S.W.2d 592, 598-99 (1933); Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 106 Tenn. 651, 62 S.W. 162, 168 (1901).
AFFIRMED.
KAHN, THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap., 765 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Deerfield Rock Corp. v. Novice R. McCLELLAN, 121 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)