MICHAEL RAY CHAPMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Chapman appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court's failure to explicitly pronounce a five-year probation term during sentencing made that portion of his sentence illegal. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that although the oral pronouncement was ambiguous, the trial court properly clarified the sentence when it denied Chapman's motion.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that although the trial court's oral pronouncement was ambiguous, it was not illegal and unambiguous. The trial court properly clarified the sentence when it denied Chapman's motion to correct illegal sentence by confirming in its written order that the sentence included five years of probation.
[1] A trial court may clarify an ambiguous oral sentence pronouncement after the sentencing hearing has concluded.
[2] When a trial court's oral sentence pronouncement is ambiguous, double jeopardy principles do not preclude clarification or correction of the sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Those cases stand for the proposition that when a trial court orally pronounces a legal and unambiguous sentence, and the sentencing hearing has been concluded, double jeopardy principles preclude the sentence from being increased. The instant case is distinguishable because the trial court's oral pronouncement was ambiguous.”
Establishes the key distinction allowing clarification despite the double jeopardy rule that normally prevents sentence increases after pronouncement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChapman was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and firearm possession by a convicted felon. He agreed to plead guilty to the firearm charge i…
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Chapman appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The written judgment reflects that Chapman was sentenced to 30.375 months in prison followed by five years probation. He contends that the probationary part of his sentence was illegal because it was not specifically pronounced during his sentencing hearing. We affirm. The trial court’s original oral pronouncement was ambiguous and that ambiguity was subsequently clarified at the time the trial court denied Chapman’s motion.
Chapman was initially charged with traf*274ficking in methamphetamine1 and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.2 The State agreed to nolle prosequi the drug offense if Chapman pled to the firearm charge. Pursuant to the plea offer, Chapman would be sentenced to 30.5 months in prison. (The new scoresheet provided for a minimum guideline sentence on the firearm charge of 30.375 months.) Upon reviewing Chapman’s lengthy criminal record, the trial court refused to accept the plea agreement. After some discussion, the trial court gave Chapman three options: (1) he could agree to a 30.375 month prison sentence followed by five years probation; (2) he could agree to a five year prison sentence with no probation to follow; or (3) he could maintain his not guilty plea and proceed to trial on both charges. Chapman chose the first option.
The trial court then conducted a plea colloquy, during which Chapman was advised, inter alia, that if he violated his probation he “fac[ed] up to 15 years, less any credit time served.” After accepting the plea, the trial court adjudicated Chapman guilty on the firearm charge and orally pronounced that he was to serve 30.375 months in the Department of Corrections. The trial court also imposed fines, costs, and attorney’s fees and permitted Chapman to pay these monies during the period of his probation. In apparent response to an earlier statement made by Chapman that he intended to move out of Florida, the trial judge advised the defendant that he could seek to transfer his probation by “making application.” However, the trial judge failed to specifically state that Chapman was to be placed on five years probation after completion of the incarcerative portion of his sentence. The State then announced a nolle prosequi on the drug offense and the sentencing hearing was concluded.
Chapman subsequently filed his motion to correct illegal sentence, contending that the written judgment was in conflict with the trial court’s oral pronouncement. He requested that the trial court strike the probationary portion of his sentence. The trial court denied Chapman’s motion, aptly observing that “it was the court’s intention, and the State and defendant’s understanding, that the sentence in the instant case included five years of probation.”
Chapman contends that Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Shepard v. State, 940 So.2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); and Comtois v. State, 891 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) require reversal in this case. We disagree. Those cases stand for the proposition that when a trial court orally pronounces a legal and tmambiguous sentence, and the sentencing hearing has been concluded, double jeopardy principles preclude the sentence from being increased. The instant case is distinguishable because the trial court’s oral pronouncement was ambiguous.
The trial judge twice referenced Chapman’s probationary obligations. Where there is an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement, the proper remedy is for the trial court to clarify the sentence imposed. Franklin v. State, 969 So.2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (where record demonstrates that during oral pronouncement of sentence, trial court made inconsistent statements, matter must be remanded to clarify sentence imposed and enter such corrected sentencing orders as may be appropriate); see also Coleman v. State, 898 So.2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, in its written order denying Chapman’s motion to cor*275rect illegal sentence, the trial court clarified the sentence imposed.
AFFIRMED.
MONACO, C.J. and COHEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Brown v. State, 225 So. 3d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…65, 1268 (Fla. 2003); accord Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007). For that reason, “[w]here there is an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement, the proper remedy is for the trial court to clarify' the sentence imposed.” Chapman v. State, 14 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); see also Franklin v. State, 969 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (remanding trial court’s denial of post-conviction motion with diréctions to resolve conflict between written sentence and ambiguous, inconsistent oral pro…
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Duncan v. State, 59 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…e is a mistake, a trial court cannot increase a legal and unambiguous sentence after the pronouncement becomes final. Id. A sentencing court may, however, clarify an ambiguous sentence, and we believe that is the circumstance here. Chapman v. State, 14 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Franklin v. State, 969 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), review denied, 983 So. 2d 1154 (Fla.2008). We suspect either that the transcript is incorrect or that the court simply misspoke in announcing the sentence. We note tha…
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Thaddeus Chaylon Martin v. State, 238 So. 3d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…controls over written document). Where a conflict exists between the written sentence and the oral pronouncement, the proper remedy is for the trial court to clarify or correct the sentence, consistent with the oral pronouncement. Chapman v. State, 14 So. 3d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Such a correction is cognizable as a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)(1), which provides that "[a] court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it ...." S…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)
- Comtois v. State, 891 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Shepard v. State, 940 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- Weston Coleman v. State, 898 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Franklin v. State, 969 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)