AARON MARSH, PETITIONER,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Aaron Marsh petitioned for writs of prohibition and habeas corpus challenging his civil commitment under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act, arguing he was not in lawful custody when the State initiated the commitment process. The court denied the petition, holding that Marsh was lawfully in custody on April 19, 1999, when the Department of Corrections provided written notice initiating the commitment process.
Marsh was in lawful custody when the State initiated the commitment process on April 19, 1999. The court concluded that the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act is that a person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process.
[1] The Jimmy Ryce Act contemplates that an individual will be lawfully in the State's custody when civil commitment proceedings are commenced.
[2] The civil commitment process under the Jimmy Ryce Act is initiated either by notice to a multidisciplinary team and state attorney or by transferring the individual to th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[T]he Legislature appears to have specifically contemplated that an individual would be lawfully in the State's custody when civil commitment proceedings are commenced under the Act.”
Establishes the legislative intent regarding lawful custody at the time commitment proceedings are initiated under the Jimmy Ryce Act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarsh was in custody with the Department of Corrections serving a sentence. On April 19, 1999, the Department of Corrections provided written notice t…
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Aaron Marsh (“Marsh”) petitions this Court for writs of prohibition and habeas corpus and asserts that he was not in lawful custody under the terms of the Jimmy Ryce Act when the State initiated commitment proceedings against him. Because we conclude that Marsh was in lawful custody when the State initiated the commitment process on April 19, 1999, we deny the petitions.
As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 107-08 (Fla.2008):
[T]he Legislature appears to have specifically contemplated that an individual would be lawfully in the State’s custody when civil commitment proceedings are commenced under the Act. The Act provides that the commitment process is initiated by the “agency with jurisdiction.” This is done in one of two ways-either by giving notice to the multidisci-pliua'ry team and state attorney under section 394.913(1), Florida Statutes (2004), which, begins the detailed process under that section, see § 394.913(1)-(4), or by transferring the individual to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services upon that person’s “immediate release from total confinement” under section 394.9135(1), Florida Statutes (2004).
(Emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that the commitment process was initiated on April 19, *12151999, when the Department of Corrections provided written notice to the Assistant Secretary for Mental Health, Department of Children and Family Services, and to the state attorney, stating that Marsh appeared to be a sexually violent predator, and that he was scheduled for release from incarceration. See § 916.33, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (renumbered as section 394.913, and amended by ch. 99-222, § 6 at 1377, Laws of Fla.).1 It is further undisputed that Marsh was in lawful custody on April 19, 1999 — the date the commitment process was initiated. See Larimore, 2 So.3d at 110-11 (concluding that “the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act is that the person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135”). Accordingly, Marsh is not entitled to the requested relief.
Petitions denied.