DANIEL D. COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Court affirmed firearm conviction but reversed cannabis conviction, holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to sever counts where evidence of prior felony conviction was essential to firearm charge but unduly prejudicial to cannabis charge.
When a defendant is charged with both possession of firearm by convicted felon and a separate drug offense, the trial court must sever the counts because evidence of prior felony conviction is necessary for the firearm charge but inadmissible and unduly prejudicial for the drug charge.
[1] Trial court discretion to deny severance of charges is sharply curtailed when one count is possession of firearm by convicted felon, because evidence of prior felony conv…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper was convicted after jury trial of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis. Evidence of hi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Severance Of Counts cases and more on FLexlaw
Cooper was convicted, after a jury trial, of possession of a firearm by a convicted *793felon,1 and possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis.2 We affirm the firearm conviction without further discussion. However, we reverse the cannabis conviction and remand for a new trial on that count, because the trial court should have granted Cooper’s pretrial motion to sever the two counts.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for severance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith-ers v. State, 826 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla.2002). However, that discretion is sharply curtailed when it concerns a request to sever a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Tucker v. State, 884 So.2d 168, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here, the admission of evidence that Cooper was a convicted felon was necessary to prove the count charging him with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, but was inadmissible and unduly prejudicial with regard to the cannabis count. See State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982); Tucker; Craft v. State, 441 So.2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Smith v. State, 434 So.2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
PALMER and SAWAYA, JJ, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Modeste v. State, 28 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…avoid any potential prejudice to the defendant on the remaining counts in the information. State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1982). The discretion to deny a motion to sever is “sharply curtailed” in these circumstances. Cooper v. State, 15 So. 3d 792, 793 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Nevertheless, a defendant must move to sever the firearm charge before trial or the right to severance is deemed waived. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.153(a); Murphy v. State, 495 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1982)
- Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2002)
- Little Tommy Tucker v. State, 884 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Craft v. State, 441 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Elbert Roy Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)