DORSCH, INC. D/B/A FLORIDA FUN BIKE SUPER CENTER/FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
NORMAN HUNT, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation appeal, the court clarified that an employer/carrier's obligation to authorize psychiatric treatment is satisfied by timely offering the claimant a choice of qualified physicians, not by actually scheduling an appointment with a specific physician. The court reversed and remanded one issue for the Judge of Compensation Claims to apply the correct legal standard.
An employer/carrier meets its statutory obligation to authorize medical treatment by timely offering a claimant qualified alternatives; it is not required to schedule an appointment with a specific physician. The Judge of Compensation Claims erred in interpreting Butler v. Bay Center to require actual scheduling of an appointment rather than timely authorization.
[1] An employer/carrier satisfies its statutory obligation to provide requested medical treatment by timely authorizing an appointment with a physician within the requested s…
[2] A Judge of Compensation Claims errs in finding a physician authorized by operation of law when the employer/carrier promptly offers qualified alternatives for medical tre…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once the employer/carrier 'authorized an appointment' with a physician within the requested specialty, the claimant had the obligation to accept care and treatment from the authorized physician”
The JCC's interpretation of Butler, which the appellate court found erroneous; clarifies the distinction between authorization and scheduling
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing the claimant's filing of a grievance and petition for benefits, the employer/carrier offered the claimant two separate lists of three psychi…
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In this appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), the Employer/Carrier (E/C) raises four issues and the Claimant raises one issue on cross-appeal. We affirm, without comment, three of the issues raised by the E/C. We reverse and remand the fourth issue for further proceedings. Because of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to reach the issue on cross-appeal.
Following Claimant’s filing of a grievance and subsequent petition for benefits, the E/C offex-ed Claimant, on two occasions, different lists of thi-ee psychiatrists from which to make a selection. In the *837order on appeal, the JCC found the E/C failed to “timely schedule an appointment for a psychiatrist to examine and provide medical care and treatment to the Claimant as requested,” citing to Butler v. Bay Center, 947 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The JCC interpreted Butler as providing that “once the employer/carrier ‘authorized an appointment’ with a physician within the requested specialty, the claimant had the obligation to accept care and treatment from the authorized physician.” The JCC then interpreted the phrase “authorized an appointment” to mean that an appointment with a specific physician was “actually scheduled.” The JCC erred in this interpretation. Butler does not stand for the proposition that an appointment must be scheduled within the specified time. It requires merely that the appointment be timely authorized.
At times, chapter 440 has required an E/C to offer a claimant a list of at least three physicians from which to select when a one-time change was requested. See, e.g., § 440.13(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002). Here, although the Claimant did not request a one-time change, the E/C’s willingness to offer Claimant a choice, as opposed to simply scheduling an appointment, did not represent a failure or a refusal on the E/C’s part to meet its statutory obligation to provide Claimant the requested medical treatment pursuant to section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). See, e.g., City of Bartow v. Brewer, 896 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“Section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, does not authorize the JCC to order treatment with a specific physician, where the E/C promptly offers qualified alternatives.”). Accordingly, the JCC erred in finding that Dr. Walker was authorized by operation of law because the E/C failed to timely schedule an appointment. On remand, the JCC shall revisit this issue applying the correct law, as set out in this opinion. We note, for purposes of the proceedings on remand, that the relevant evidence as to whether the E/C responded in a timely fashion to Claimant’s request for psychiatric treatment begins with the grievance filed in November 2003.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
WEBSTER, DAVIS and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
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Harrell v. Citrus Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Fsbit Ins. Tr., 25 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…filiated with the previous physician within 5 days after receipt of the request.” (emphasis added). To timely respond to a claimant’s request, an E/C is not required to schedule an appointment with the newly authorized physician. See Dorsch v. Hunt, 15 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (explaining E/C is not required to actually schedule an appointment to comply with its statutory duty to furnish medical treatment at claimant’s request). Based on a plain reading of the statute, an E/C is required, however, to a…
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Hmshost Corporation/Gallagher Bassett Servs. Inc. v. Guerda Frederic, 102 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…the five days section 440.13(2)(f) allows. The E/C’s informing Claimant of a particular doctor’s name within five days of receiving the request satisfied section 440.13(2)(f), even though the E/C did not contact the doctor. See Dorsch, Inc. v. Hunt, 15 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Harrell v. Citrus County Sch. Bd., 25 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). We distinguish Pardo v. Denny’s, Inc., 631 So. 2d 388. (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), on the ground that its facts involved the initial provision of care rather than, a…
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City of Bartow & Commercial Risk Mgmt. v. Isidro Flores (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…tor.”); Harrell v. Citrus Cty. Sch. Bd., 25 So. 3d 675, 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that “[t]o timely respond to a claimant’s request, an E/C is not required to schedule an appointment with the newly authorized physician”); Dorsch, Inc. v. Hunt, 15 So. 3d 836, 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding authorization in the context of section 440.13(2)(f), does not “mean that an appointment with a specific physician was ‘actually scheduled. . . .’ It requires merely that the appointment be timely authorized”). Her…
Authorities Cited
- Butler v. BAY Center/CHUBB Ins. Co., 947 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- City OF Bartow & Commercial Risk Mgmt. v. Brewer, 896 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)