THERESA G. DOSS-POUNCEY, APPELLANT,
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION AND WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLEES
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the Unemployment Appeals Commission's decision disqualifying Doss-Pouncey from unemployment benefits because she left work without good cause attributable to the employer. The court rejected her arguments that she was deprived of proper appeal rights and clarified the distinction between postmark dates and receipt dates for timely filing of appeals.
The Commission's determination was properly affirmed. The referee correctly applied the law in finding Doss-Pouncey disqualified from benefits. The employer's appeal was timely because the applicable rule measures timeliness by postmark date for mailed appeals, not receipt date, and the postmark was May 1, 2008, which was within twenty days of the April 11, 2008 determination.
[1] On appeal from an unemployment benefits decision, the Unemployment Appeals Commission's order is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating err…
[2] In the absence of a hearing transcript, a referee's findings of fact in an unemployment compensation case are assumed correct, and appellate review is limited to the refe…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On appeal, the Commission's order is entitled to a presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.”
Establishes the standard of review in unemployment compensation appeals and allocation of burden of proof.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTheresa G. Doss-Pouncey left her employment and applied for unemployment benefits. The agency issued an initial determination on April 11, 2008, which…
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We affirm the final order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission approving a referee’s decision that appellant was disqualified from benefits because she left work without good cause attributable to the employer. Appellant has not provided a transciipt of the hearing before the referee. “On appeal, the Commission’s *253order is entitled to a presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.” Leedham v. State Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 950 So.2d 475, 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In the absence of a transcript of the unemployment compensation hearing, the referee’s findings of fact are assumed correct and this court’s review is limited to whether the referee’s conclusions or application of the law to the facts is incorrect. Rollins v. Bay HR, Inc., 968 So.2d 697, 698-99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In this case, the referee correctly applied the law.
Appellant also argues that the initial determination made by the agency should have been final because the employer did not timely appeal the decision within twenty days after the mailing date of the determination. In support, she relies on the Unemployment Appeals Commission’s stamp on the letter invoking the right to appeal, indicating that it was received on May 5, which was twenty-four days after the April 11, 2008, determination. The stamp of receipt does not represent the date of filing. The referee’s order provided as follows with respect to determining the timeliness of an appeal: “If filed online, the confirmation date is the filing date. If mailed, the postmark date is the filing date. If faxed, the date stamped received is the filing date.” (Emphasis added). The record reveals that the employer timely invoked its right to appeal twenty days after the determination in a letter dated and postmarked May 1, 2008. Therefore, we reject this claim.
Affirmed.
POLEN, J., and KAPLAN, MICHAEL G., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Aliaksandr Yermalayeu v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Comm'n, 114 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…the health challenges and other personal difficulties outlined in Mr. Yermalayeu’s filing with our court, our review is limited to determining whether the RAAC correctly followed the law in its decision. Doss-Pouncey v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 16 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA [*212] 2009). Because the referee’s decision was dictated by section 448.151(8), Florida Statutes (2011), we affirm the RAAC’s final order. See, e.g., Peterson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 77 So. 3d 905, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 20…
Authorities Cited
- Leedham v. State of Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Vill. Beach Mkt., Inc., 950 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Rollins v. BAY HR, Inc., 968 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)