SHAWN BROWN A/K/A BRADY JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Shawn Brown appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion seeking credit for time served. The court reversed, finding that the motion was not procedurally barred by collateral estoppel despite Brown's prior unsuccessful 3.800(a) motion on a similar issue, because the instant motion raised a slightly different claim and rule 3.850 allows claims to proceed through sworn allegations and evidentiary hearings.
The rule 3.850 motion is not procedurally barred by collateral estoppel because it raises a slightly different claim than the prior 3.800(a) motion, and rule 3.850 allows sufficient claims to proceed through sworn allegations and evidentiary hearings, unlike rule 3.800(a) which requires identification of records showing an illegal sentence.
[1] A claim raised in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion is not procedurally barred by collateral estoppel if it differs from a claim previously raised and rej…
[2] A Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion requires a defendant to identify records supporting the claim of an illegal sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While rule 3.800(a) requires a defendant to identify records that show the sentence is illegal, rule 3.850 allows a defendant to state a sufficient claim through sworn allegations, and if the claim is sufficient, the defendant can build a record through an evidentiary hearing.”
Establishes the key procedural distinction between the two rules that supports why the 3.850 motion should not be barred by collateral estoppel
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown previously filed a rule 3.800(a) motion through counsel seeking 508 days of jail credit from the date of a Broward detainer. That motion was den…
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Shawn Brown timely appeals the lower court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. In ruling on the motion, the lower court adopted the state’s response, which asserted that Brown’s claim was barred by collateral estoppel because it had been previously raised and rejected in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion. Brown had previously raised a variation of the instant issue in a rule 3.800(a) motion, filed through counsel, without any supporting documentation. That motion was denied, and Brown appealed. Then, he asked this court to voluntarily dismiss his appeal without prejudice for him to file a rule 3.850 motion. This court granted the request and dismissed the appeal on April 30, 2008. While rule 3.800(a) requires a defendant to identify records that show the sentence is illegal, rule 3.850 allows a defendant to state a sufficient claim through sworn allegations, and if the claim is sufficient, the defendant can build a record through an evidentiary hearing. *259Thus, we find the current motion is not procedurally barred.
In addition, the present motion raises a slightly different claim. The rule 3.800(a) motion filed by counsel sought 508 days of credit for time served in a Miami jail from the date of a Broward detainer; whereas, the instant rule 3.850 motion seeks 483 days of credit from the date of the arrest on the Broward fugitive warrant as reflected in the Miami arrest affidavit. See Martinez v. State, 940 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that if defendant was actually arrested in Dade County on the Broward County warrant, he could be entitled to credit in one of two circumstances). Because the instant motion is not procedurally barred, we reverse and remand for the lower court to consider its merits.
Reversed and remanded for■ the trial court to consider the motion on the merits.
CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.