HUMBERTO A. MOLLINEA, FORMER HUSBAND, APPELLANT,
v.
RAQUEL D. MOLLINEA, N/K/A RAQUEL DIAZ, FORMER WIFE, APPELLEE
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The appellate court dismissed the appeal as premature because the trial court's order vacating portions of prior post-dissolution enforcement orders failed to conclusively resolve the parties' mortgage payment obligations, leaving judicial labor incomplete.
An order that vacates portions of prior post-dissolution enforcement orders but fails to conclusively resolve the parties' respective mortgage payment responsibilities is not final and therefore does not support an appeal.
[1] An order that vacates portions of prior post-dissolution enforcement orders without conclusively resolving all issues between the parties lacks the finality necessary to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband appealed an order entered November 17, 2008, by the trial court that vacated portions of two prior post-dissolution enforcement ord…
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The appellant has sought review of an Order on Former Wife’s Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside June 4, 2007, Order on Former Wife’s Emergency Motion and June 10, 2008, Order on All Pending Motions, which was entered by the lower tribunal on November 17, 2008. This order, which vacates portions of two prior post-dissolution enforcement orders, fails to conclude the lower tribunal’s judicial labor on the issue of the parties’ respective responsibilities to pay the mortgage on the former marital home. Therefore, the appeal is premature. See S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla.1974); see also Caufield, v. Cantele, 837 So.2d 371, 375 (Fla.2002) (reaffirming the traditional test for finality requiring that no further action by the court will be necessary); McGurn v. Scott, 596 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla.1992) (stating “[i]t is well settled that a judgment attains the degree of finality necessary to support an appeal when it adjudicates the merits of the cause and disposes of the action between the parties, leaving no judicial labor to be done except the execution of the judgment”). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
The Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed on January 27, 2009, is denied.
ALLEN, DAVIS, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Wilmott Webb, 304 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1974)
- Caufield v. Gino Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2002)
- McGURN v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992)