GLANTZ AND GLANTZ, P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA CHINCHILLA, APPELLEE
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A law firm appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees for probate estate representation through a prepaid legal services program. The trial court reduced the expert-determined reasonable fee of $13,500 by 51%, but the appellate court held this was an abuse of discretion because the hourly rate had already been discounted by 51% through the prepaid legal services contract.
The trial court abused its discretion by applying the 51% discount to the reasonable fee without accounting for the fact that the expert's opinion was based on an already-discounted hourly rate. The law firm is entitled to $12,400 in attorney's fees plus costs.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies a further discount to an attorney's fee that has already been discounted pursuant to a prepaid legal services program,…
[2] Attorneys representing probate estates are entitled to receive reasonable compensation for their services.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court accepted the expert's affidavit that $13,500 was a reasonable, already discounted fee. The trial court did not find the hours or the discounted rate to be unreasonable. Nevertheless, the trial court inexplicably reduced the reasonable fee by another 51%. In doing so, it abused its discretion.”
This establishes the core holding that applying an additional discount to an already-discounted reasonable fee constitutes an abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA personal representative, who was a member of a prepaid legal services program, retained Glantz & Glantz, P.A. to handle estate matters including def…
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A law firm appeals an award of attorney’s fees for representation of its client through a prepaid legal services program. The firm argues that the trial court erred in reducing the fee to 51% of the amount presented by the expert as a reasonable fee. We agree and reverse.
The personal representative of an estate was a member of prepaid legal services program. The program referred her to the law firm of Glantz & Glantz, P.A., where the personal representative retained Mark Mastrarrigo to handle estate matters.
Subsequently, the personal representative wrote a letter to the court expressing her concern about the law firm’s billing, prompting the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Testimony revealed that the attorney documented 123 billable hours defending a will contest, filing and pursuing a motion to disqualify another attorney based on a conflict of interest, and working with a curator in connection with the sale of the estate’s property.
Pursuant to the prepaid legal services program, the attorney charged $115 per hour, a 51% discounted rate from the normal billing rate of $225 per hour. The total charges amounted to $12,400 plus costs. The law firm submitted an affidavit from an expert attesting to the reasonableness of the fees and costs, specifically that $13,500 was a reasonable fee for the services rendered. Testimony evidenced that *713this amount was based on the discounted hourly rate and not on the normal billing rate.
The court entered an order awarding the law firm fees in the amount of $6885, 51% of the $13,500 reasonable fee attested to by the expert. The court denied the law firm’s motion for rehearing, from which the law firm now appeals.
We review orders on attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Bitterman v. Bitterman, 685 So.2d 861, 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 714 So.2d 356 (Fla.1998); Sitomer v. First of America Bank-Central, 667 So.2d 456, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The law firm argues that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the 51% discount to the reasonable fee attested to by the expert without considering that the reasonable hourly rate had already been discounted by 51% pursuant to the prepaid legal services program. We agree.
Attorneys representing probate estates are entitled to receive reasonable compensation. § 733.6171, Fla. Stat. (2007). “[A] probate court should consider the nature of the services rendered and the necessity for their performance, together with the reasonableness of the charges.” Estate of Brock, 695 So.2d 714, 718 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Section (5) enumerates nine specific factors a court must consider in determining a reasonable fee. § 733.6171(5)(a), Fla. Stat.
Here, the prepaid legal services contract rate of $115 per hour is presumed to be reasonable. See, e.g., Sotolongo v. Brake, 616 So.2d 413, 413-14 (Fla.1992). The 123 hours expended is also reasonable given that the attorney testified to the services rendered by the law firm in representing the personal representative in a will contest, a motion to disqualify another lawyer, and work done with the curator. The trial court accepted the expert’s affidavit that $13,500 was a reasonable, already discounted fee. The trial court did not find the hours or the discounted rate to be unreasonable. Nevertheless, the trial court inexplicably reduced the reasonable fee by another 51%. In doing so, it abused its discretion.
We therefore reverse and remand the case to the trial court to award the law firm $12,400 in attorney’s fees plus costs.
Reversed and Remanded.
TAYLOR, J., and SHAHOOD, GEORGE, A., Senior Judge, concur.
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Diwakar v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 143 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…judgment. We first address Diwakar’s argument that the award of attorneys’ fees was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The standard of review of an award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of discretion. Glantz & Glantz, P.A. v. Chinchilla, 17 So. 3d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citations omitted). “We will uphold a trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees so long as it is supported by substantial, competent evidence.” Effective Teleservices, Inc. v. Smith, 132 So. 3d 335, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (ci…
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Robin Roshkind, P.A. v. MacHiela, 45 So. 3d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…ess of the fees. The firm appeals the order denying fees and argues the court erred in requiring independent expert witness testimony.1 We review trial court orders on attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Glantz & Glantz, P.A. v. Chinchilla, 17 So. 3d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We have de novo review however of the trial court’s interpretation of law. G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 982 (Fla.2008). In Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla.1982), our Supreme Court held “that an attorney employed…
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Jamilette Hallac v. Hallac, 88 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…Diaz II”), and Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1997), that the court did not abuse its discretion in its decision on attorney’s fees. We review the trial court’s order under an abuse of discretion standard. Glantz and Glantz, P.A. v. Chinchilla, 17 So. 3d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Our analysis of the issues requires us to separate the denial of the wife’s fees and the award of the husband’s fees. Denial of a Portion of Attorney’s Fees to Wife While Florida law holds that a refusal to accept an offe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bitterman v. Anette Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1998)
- In re Re-assignment of Judge Robert T. Benton, II, 695 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Maney v. State, 685 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Est. OF Conway Brock v. Newman D. Brock, 695 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Sitomer v. First OF Am. Bank-Central, 667 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Sotolongo v. Brake, 616 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1992)