RANDAL BOWLES, PETITIONER,

v.

WALTER A. MCNEIL, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT

Citator

Cited By

• City OF Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So. 3d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
  …2. No matter; whether under subsection 1 or subsection 2, the Smiths’ present use of their property — and its anticipated future use — is for an actual, nonspeculative purpose: residential. The City also relies on City of Jacksonville v. Coffield, 18 So. 3d 589, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), claiming the Smiths had no “vested right” to the claimed use of their residential lot. The definition of “inordinate burden,” however, speaks in terms of government action that impacts “existing or vested uses” that become…

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• Ocean Concrete, Inc. v. Indian River Cnty., 241 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
• Finr II, Inc. v. Hardee Cnty., 164 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
  …eal property existed and, if so, whether, considering the settlement offer and statement of allowable uses, the governmental entity or entities have inordinately burdened the real property.” § 70.001(6)(a); see also City of Jacksonville v. Coffield, 18 So. 3d 589, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). As Judge Swanson stated in his dissent in Smith, “the statutory phrase ‘directly restricted or limited the use of real property1 is properly construed to refer to the issue of causation and simply requires the action of a g…

Authorities Cited

• Milord v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 4 So. 3d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)