DAVID BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
On remand from the Florida Supreme Court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the revocation of David Brown's probation, holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Yisrael v. State, which restricted the admissibility of Department of Corrections release-date letters, does not apply to probation revocation proceedings where hearsay evidence may be considered if not the sole basis for revocation.
The Supreme Court's holding in Yisrael does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. Hearsay evidence is admissible in probation revocation hearings so long as the revocation decision is not solely based on that hearsay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Brown's probation because it considered the hearsay only as corroborating evidence alongside other competent evidence.
[1] Hearsay evidence is admissible in a probation revocation proceeding, provided the decision to revoke is not based solely on hearsay.
[2] A trial court's decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In a probation revocation proceeding, however, the court may freely consider hearsay evidence so long as the decision to revoke is not solely based on that hearsay.”
Establishes the key legal principle distinguishing probation revocation proceedings from other criminal proceedings regarding hearsay admissibility.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Brown's probation was revoked by the trial court. The state presented evidence of Brown's probationer status, including an Inmate Release Inform…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Public Records Exception cases and more on FLexlaw
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Appellant David Brown challenges the revocation of his probation, claiming that the state failed to prove his status as probationer. This court previously affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Brown’s probation, but the supreme court subsequently reversed that decision and remanded the case to us to consider the application of its holding in Yisrael v. State, 993 So.2d 952 (Fla.2008). Brown v. State, 7 So.3d 528 (Fla.2009).
We conclude that the supreme court’s holding in Yisrael does not control the disposition of this case. In Yisrael, the supreme court held that release-date letters issued by the Department of Corrections are non-admissible hearsay unless they are authenticated and admitted under the public or business records exception. Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 960. In a probation revocation proceeding, however, the court may freely consider hearsay evidence so long as the decision to revoke is not solely based on that hearsay. Russell v. State, 982 So.2d 642, 646 (Fla.2008). The trial court’s decision to revoke probation is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In this ease, the court considered hearsay evidence in the form of an Inmate Release Information Record supplied by the Department of Corrections. Insofar *724as the trial court considered that document, its contents were used to corroborate evidence from Brown’s court file and records from the Office of Probation and were not the sole basis for revoking Brown’s probation. Because hearsay is admissible in a revocation hearing, and because the trial court considered the hearsay only as corroborating evidence, Yisrael does not apply to this case.
A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Brown’s probation. The court below was presented with competent evidence that Brown was the probationer, and the state met its burden of “satisfying] the conscience of the court” that Brown violated his probation. Lopez v. State, 722 So.2d 936, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Affirmed.
MAY, DAMOORGIAN, and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McInerney v. State, 213 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…e at a probation revocation hearing, which has been described as a ‘deferred sentencing proceeding.’ ” State v. Davis, 133 So. 3d 1101, 1105 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227, 1230 (Fla. 2008)); see also Brown v. State, 18 So. 3d 723, 723-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).1 Yet, in cases where the State bore the burden to prove the prerequisites for enhanced sentencing in non-capital cases, hearsay has been held inadmissible absent an exception. See, e.g., Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952…
Authorities Cited
- Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008)
- Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2008)
- Lopez v. State, 722 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Brown v. State, 7 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2009)