MICHAEL R. POLLARD, APPELLANT,
v.
K.C. CROMWELL, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Second District Court of Appeal's declaration that section 448.24(1)(b) was unconstitutionally vague, holding that the statute has a definite interpretation as established in Liner II.
Section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutionally vague because the statute has a definite interpretation as supplied by the Court in Liner II.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague when the court supplies a definite interpretation of its terms, curing any facial vagueness challenge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Second District Court of Appeal declared section 448.24(1)(b) unconstitutionally vague, adopting the Fourth District's rationale from Liner I. The…
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We have for review K.C. Cromwell, Inc. v. Pollard, 974 So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), in which the Second District Court of Appeal declared that section 448.24(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003), was unconstitutionally vague. In so holding, the Second District explicitly agreed with and adopted the rationale of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Liner I”), rev’d, 990 So.2d 473 (Fla.2008). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
We stayed proceedings in the present case pending disposition of Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 990 So.2d 473 (Fla.2008) (“Liner II”), in which we supplied a definite interpretation of the relevant statute and ultimately reversed the Fourth District’s decision in Liner I. Once Liner II was final, we issued an order in the present case directing appel-lee to show cause why we should not summarily reverse and remand the decision on appeal for reconsideration in light of Liner II. Upon consideration of appellee’s response and appellant’s reply thereto, we have determined to so proceed.
We therefore reverse the decision on appeal and remand to the Second District for reconsideration upon application of our decision in Liner II.
It is so ordered.
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
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Previewing 3 of 72 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 962 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 990 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2008)
- Poirier v. Newton, 974 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)