W.J., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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W.J., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for resisting an officer without violence after running from police at a public housing project. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest W.J. for trespass based on a prior warning, regardless of the later dismissal of the trespass charge at trial.
The court held that probable cause existed for the officer to arrest W.J. for trespass based on the prior warning and W.J.'s return to the property, and that the officer was therefore engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty. The fact that the trespass charge was later dismissed at trial does not defeat the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest.
[1] Probable cause to arrest for trespass exists when a person returns to private property after being warned to leave and informed that they will be arrested for trespass if…
[2] A conviction for resisting an officer without violence can stand even if the defendant is acquitted of the underlying offense for which the arrest was attempted, provided…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer had previously ordered W.J. to leave the housing project and warned that he would be arrested for trespass if he returned. W.J. returned. There was probable cause to arrest him for trespass.”
Establishes the basis for probable cause to arrest W.J. for trespass.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer previously warned W.J. to leave a public housing project playground and told him he would be arrested for trespass if he returned. Two days…
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This is an appeal of an order determining that W.J. committed the offense of resisting an officer without violence. We affirm.
The arresting officer in this case had previously encountered W.J. in the playground of a Liberty City public housing project. The officer warned W.J. to leave the property and warned him that he would arrest him for trespass if he returned.
Two days later that officer, with other officers, drove to the playground. They observed a group shooting dice and placing bets. W.J. was in the group but the officer did not observe him actually gambling.
When the officers emerged from their unmarked vehicles and identified themselves as police officers, W.J. and another boy ran away. The officer caught W.J. W.J. was charged with resisting an officer without violence and with trespass. The court found that W.J. committed the offense of resisting an officer without violence, withheld adjudication, and placed W.J. on probation. W.J. has appealed.
W.J. argues that there was neither reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, nor probable cause. He contends that in the absence of a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2008), and that the charge must be dismissed. We conclude that there was probable cause.
The officer had previously ordered W.J. to leave the housing project and warned that he would be arrested for trespass if he returned. W.J. returned. There was probable cause to arrest him for trespass. See § 810.09, Fla. Stat. (2008).
At trial, W.J. successfully obtained a judgment of dismissal on the trespass charge, because the State did not establish that the officer had the authority to warn W.J. to stay off the property. However, the fact that the State did not prevail at trial on the trespass charge does not defeat the fact that probable cause for the arrest existed. See E.W. v. State, 873 So.2d 485, 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty. As this ground is disposi-*1261tive, we need not reach the parties’ other arguments on the issue.
Affirmed.
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D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…In the absence of evidence that the property owner had given police permission to issue trespass warnings or that the property was “posted” within the meaning of the trespass statute, appellant could not be convicted of trespass. See W.J. v. State, 18 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (noting appellant obtained judgment of dismissal on trespass charge because State failed to present evidence that officer who previously warned appellant against trespass had authority to give such warning); Smith v. State, 778 So…1 / 2
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T.D. v. State, 83 So. 3d 990 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…e underlying criminal activity providing the basis for the arrest, battery on a school official or interference with the function of an educational institution, does not defeat the existence of probable cause supporting an arrest. See W.J. v. State, 18 So. 3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).…
Authorities Cited
- E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)