LARRY MOGER, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Moger challenged the Florida Parole Commission's suspension of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) by petition for extraordinary relief. The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the petition as time-barred under Florida's statute of limitations for non-habeas corpus extraordinary relief, holding that the petition filed more than one year after the final agency action was untimely.
The petition was properly deemed untimely because it was filed more than one year after the final agency action, and therefore the denial of the writ of mandamus was correct. A PPRD suspension is appropriately reviewed by mandamus, but such review must be sought within the statutory time period.
[1] A petition for extraordinary relief from final Florida Parole Commission agency action affirming the suspension of an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date is subject…
[2] Agency action by the Florida Parole Commission regarding an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date diminishes with the passage of time, reducing the necessity for judic…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“agency action by the Florida Parole Commission "with respect to an inmate's PPRD diminishes with the passage of time, so that the necessity and advisability of judicial intervention ... also subsides with the passage of time."”
Establishes the legal principle that timely review of PPRD actions is important because their significance decreases over time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida Parole Commission conducted an Extraordinary Review on April 5, 2006, affirming its previous decision to suspend Appellant's PPRD. Appella…
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Appellant’s petition for extraordinary relief from final Florida Parole Commission agency action affirming the suspension of Appellant’s Presumptive Parole Release Date (“PPRD”) was properly deemed untimely by the circuit court pursuant to section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes. The final agency action occurred on April 5, 2006, upon the Commission’s “Extraordinary Review” of the previous negative determination under section 947.18, Florida Statutes and suspension of Appellant’s PPRD.
It has long been recognized that agency action by the Florida Parole Commission “with respect to an inmate’s PPRD diminishes with the passage of time, so that the necessity and advisability of judicial intervention ... also subsides with the passage of time.” Jordan v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 403 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A PPRD is “presumptive only; it does not indicate the effective parole release date.” Id. As stated in Armour v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 963 So.2d 305, 306-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), “a Commission order suspending an inmate’s PPRD and thereby refusing to set an effective parole release date is appropriately reviewed by mandamus.” See also, Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 625 So.2d 926, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Because the trial court properly classified Appellant’s action below as one for non-habeas corpus extraordinary relief, and because Appellant, a prisoner, sought extraordinary relief more than one year after the agency action of the Florida Parole Commission became final, the trial court’s denial of the writ of mandamus as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes, was correct and no error has been shown by Appellant.
The order of the circuit court is therefore AFFIRMED.
KAHN, BENTON, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Barreiro v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review, 164 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…the dismissal of the mandamus petition to the extent it challenged the initial establishment of Barrei- [*1251] ro’s PPRD. Not only was the petition untimely as it relates to that decision, see § 95.11(5)(f), Fla. Stat.; Moger v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 22 So. 3d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), but any challenge to the initial establishment of the PPRD is also barred by res judicata based on Barreiro I. However, we reverse the denial of the.petition to the extent it challenged the Commission’s decision not to cha…
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Lewis v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 112 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…com-plainf/petition facially sufficient, the court issued an Order to Show Cause. The Commission filed a response which included an allegation that the petition was time-barred pursuant to section 95.11(5)(f) and Moger v. Florida Parole Commission, 22 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), rev. denied 32 So. 3d 59 (Fla.2010). Appellant filed a reply, arguing that section 95.11(5)(f) violated the separation of powers doctrine and was therefore unconstitutional. The lower court dismissed the petition as time-barred…1 / 2
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Williams v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Hill v. State, 403 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Armour v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 963 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)