SUSAN MACK AND BEN MACK, APPELLANTS,
v.
DANIEL C. PERRI, ESQUIRE FOR THE ESTATE OF GEORGE WATTS, M.D., APPELLEE
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The court held that the Macks' claims against the estate were untimely filed and therefore barred by statute.
[1] Claims against a decedent's estate are barred if not filed within three months of the first publication of the notice to creditors.
[2] A two-year non-claim period following a decedent's death is a jurisdictional statute that automatically bars untimely claims against the estate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Macks filed claims against the Estate of George Watts based on alleged medical malpractice after the statutory deadline for filing claims had pass…
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Susan Mack and Ben Mack appeal a final order granting the petition of the Estate of George Watts, appellee, to strike the Macks’ claims against the Estate as untimely. For the following reasons, we affirm all issues raised on appeal.
The decedent, George Watts, a physician, died on November 18, 2004. The first notice to creditors was published on May 14, 2005. On October 31, 2005, the Macks first filed their claims against the Estate based on alleged medical malpractice in connection with surgery Dr. Watts performed on Susan Mack’s ankle. The Macks filed a malpractice action against the Estate on January 30, 2006. In February 2009, the Estate filed a petition in the probate court to limit the Macks’ claim in the malpractice action to the proceeds of malpractice insurance, see section 733.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and the Macks filed petitions seeking to strike the Estate’s objections to their claims.
We agree with the trial court that the Macks’ claims against the estate are barred by sections 733.702(1)(3),1 and *698733.710(1),2 Florida Statutes (2005). The Macks’ claims were filed more than three months from the date the notice to creditors was first published. See § 733.702(1). Further, the Macks did not file a request for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) until after the running of the two-year non-claim period in section 733.710(1). As the Supreme Court held in May v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 (Fla.2000), “section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceeding.” The May court explained that this statute “represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent’s estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent’s assets.” Id. (quoting Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). Here, the Macks’ claims were untimely filed under section 733.702(1). Although section 733.702(3) provides for an extension, the claim and motion for an extension must be filed before the operation of the two-year non-claim provision. May, 771 So.2d at 1157.
We also reject the Macks’ assertion that their claim was timely filed when measured from the date of publication of a second notice to creditors by the estate. The time period under section 733.702(1) runs from “the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors.” As the Supreme Court held in Estate of Williamson v. Murphy, 95 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1957), a second publication will be deemed “unnecessary surplusage” which has no “affect [on] the validity or effectiveness of the first notice published.”
AFFIRMED.
WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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- David R. MAY Ad Litem of the Estate of Oscar T. Bradley v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000)
- Comerica Bank & Tr. v. SDI Operating P'rs, L.P., 673 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- In re Est. of Carrie Williamson v. Murphy, 95 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1956)